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I Article I
Knowledge, Recklessness and the
Connection Requirement Between Actus
Reus and Mens Rea
Alexander F. Sarch*
Abstract
It is a foundational, but underappreciated principle of criminal
liability that being guilty of a crime requires not only possessing the
requisite mens rea and actus reus, but also that this mens rea be
appropriately connected to the actus reus. That is, the former must
"concur with" or "actuate" the latter. While there has been substantial
discussion of the connection requirement as applied to the mens rea of
intent, the meaning of this requirement as applied to knowledge and
recklessness has received far less attention. In this Article, I consider
one of the few sophisticated attempts to spell out the connection
requirement as applied to knowledge and recklessness crimes-namely,
the counterfactual approach offered by Ken Simons. However, I argue
that this sort of approach faces serious problems. In its place, I defend a
different kind of approach to the connection requirement-one that does
* Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Law and Philosophy, University of Southern
California. The author would like to thank Erik Encarnacion, Andrei Marmor, Jon
Quong, Steven Schaus, Ken Simons, Will Thomas and Gideon Yaffe for helpful
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INTRODUCTION
William J. Jackson was supposed to show up in court, but didn't.1
He faced charges of driving with a suspended license, and although two
court dates had been set in advance of his upcoming trial, he missed them
both.2 At his subsequent trial for the crime of knowingly failing to
appear in court, Jackson claimed he had made an honest mistake about
the first court date, and then assumed he would be notified when the
1. Jackson v. State, 85 P.3d 1042 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
2. Id.
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second court date was rescheduled.3 The jury didn't believe him, and he
was convicted.4
On appeal, Jackson argued that the trial court had erred in rejecting
his requested jury instructions.5 He had asked that the jury be instructed
that he "not be found guilty unless the State proved that, on the very
dates that Jackson was scheduled to appear in court... Jackson
consciously considered his obligation to appear in court and decided to
ignore it."'6 Jackson argued that the trial court had erred in declining to
give these instructions because it amounted to abandoning the
requirement of "finding a 'concurrence of... guilty act and... guilty
mind."
7
Jackson's litigation strategy in this case relied on a foundational, but
often underappreciated, principle of criminal liability, according to which
conviction of a crime requires not only possessing the requisite mens rea
and actus reus, but also that this mens rea be appropriately connected to
8the actus reus. As Ken Simons puts it, "the culpable state of mind must
'concur' with the act causing the harm in time, and in the right way."9
What is more, it is generally agreed that the required connection between
mens rea and actus reus involves some form of temporal concurrence.10
Accordingly, Jackson's attorney must have reasoned that the r quisite
temporal concurrence between mens rea and actus reus cannot have
existed unless Jackson consciously attended to his knowledge of his
3. Id
4. Id. at 1044.
5. Id at 1043.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. See 1 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.3 (2d ed. 2014) ("With those
crimes which require some mental fault (whether intention, knowledge, recklessness, or
negligence) in addition to an act or omission, it is a basic premise of Anglo-American
criminal law that the physical conduct and the state of mind must concur."); JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 199 (5th ed. 2009) (observing that the
"principle of concurrence contains two components:" first, "the defendant must possess
the requisite mens rea at the same moment" as the actus reus, and second, "[tlhe
defendant's conduct that caused the social harm must have been set into motion or
impelled by the thought process that constituted the mens rea of the offense"); see also
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (describing crime "as a compound
concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an
evil-doing hand"). The connection requirement has also been codified in some states'
criminal codes. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 20 (2014) ("In every crime or public offense
there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.").
9. Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for "Culpable Indifference" Simply Punish for
"Bad Character"? Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus
Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 219, 231-32 (2002).
10. LAFAVE, supra note 8 (noting that "it is sometimes assumed that there cannot be
such concurrence unless the mental and physical aspects exist at precisely the same
moment of time," though observing that this is not sufficient for the requirement to be
satisfied). See also DRESSLER, supra note 8 at 199-200.
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obligation to appear in court at the same time as he performed the actus
reus of the crime charged (i.e., did something other than appearing in
court on the day he was supposed to be there).
The Court of Appeals, however, rightly rejected Jackson's
argument.'1  He had misunderstood the nature of the connection
requirement-sometimes also called the requirement of a "union," "joint
operation," or "concurrence" between mens rea and actus reus.12 As the
court explained, this requirement is satisfied only if "the defendant's
culpable mental state actuates the prohibited conduct, even though there
may not be strict simultaneity between the two.' 13 The court reasoned
that Jackson's awareness of his obligation to appear in court on the
relevant day might well have been involved in actuating his failure to
appear, even though this awareness only occurred well before the date on
which he was due in court. For example, the court noted, "Jackson
would be guilty of 'knowingly' failing to appear if he decided early on
that he would not attend his scheduled court appearances, and he then
dismissed the matter from his mind."'14 Accordingly, the court affirmed
Jackson's conviction for misdemeanor failure to appear.15
Although the Jackson decision appears sound, it nonetheless raises
a number of difficult questions about the connection requirement. First,
what does it mean for a particular piece of knowledge to be involved in
actuating one's conduct? It is relatively clear what it takes for the
11. Jackson, 85 P.3d at 1043-44.
12. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 20 (2014) ("In every crime or public offense
there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal
negligence."); Jenkins v. State, 877 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Nev. 1994) ("To constitute
crime there must be unity of act and intent. In every crime or public offense
there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal
negligence."); State v. Sunday, No. 39169, 2013 WL 5329290, at *3-4 (Idaho
Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2013) (holding that the challenged jury instructions
"adequately instructed the jury that a union or joint operation of act and intent
existed"); People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 73 (Colo. 1981) ("In order to subject a
person to criminal liability for his conduct, there generally must be a
concurrence of an unlawful act (actus reus ) and a culpable mental state (mens
rea ).").
13. Jackson, 85 P.3d at 1043 (emphasis added). See also LAFAVE, supra note 8
(noting that the connection requirement is satisfied "when the defendant's
mental state actuates the physical conduct") (emphasis added); DRESSLER supra
note 8, at 199 (observing that "[t]he defendant's conduct that caused the social
harm must have been set into motion or impelled by the thought process that
constituted the mens rea of the offense") (emphasis added).
14. Jackson, 85 P.3d at 1043.
15. Id. at 1043-44.
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intention to bring about p to actuate a given action, A. 16 Roughly put, it
requires that one have an intention to bring about p, and this intention
(non-deviantly) causes one to do A, such that we can plausibly say A was
done in order to bring about p.'7 But what of knowledge? When one
acts while merely knowing that p, it usually will not be the case that one
acts as one does in order to bring about p. So what connection must
there be between the actus reus and the relevant piece of knowledge in
order for me to be blamed or punished for acting with this knowledge?
If, as Jackson suggests, it is not merely a matter of consciously
possessing the knowledge at he time one acts, then what is required?
Second, and perhaps more difficult, how does the connection
requirement apply to cases involving the familiar phenomenon of latent
or otherwise merely dispositional knowledge?18  Recall the Jackson
court's dictum that Jackson would have been guilty of knowingly failing
to appear "if he decided early on that he would not attend his scheduled
court appearances, and he then dismissed the matter from his mind."' 9
Even if, on the day in question, he was not consciously attending to the
fact that he needed to be in court (i.e. his knowledge of his obligation to
appear in court was merely latent or dispositional), the connection
requirement still plausibly would be satisfied. But in other cases of
latent knowledge, it seems the requirement might not be satisfied.
Suppose that in the days leading up to the appointed court dates, Jackson
had been well aware of his obligation to appear in court, but then on the
day of his first appearance, he received some shocking news or had a
traumatic experience that prevented him from attending to his knowledge
of needing to be in court, i.e. which made this knowledge lose all its
salience for him. If he continued to possess knowledge of his court date,
albeit latently, and it was only because of such an understandable
disruption to his normal cognitive processes that he failed to appear in
court, it is far less clear that the connection requirement would be
satisfied. Thus, whatever role knowledge must play in actuating one's
conduct in order for one to be properly punished as a knowing
wrongdoer, we will need some principled way to decide when such latent
or merely dispositional knowledge is or is not appropriately connected to
one's conduct for it to be a proper basis for criminal sanctions
16. Throughout this article, "p" will be used as a variable designating a
proposition and "A" will be used as a variable designating an action.
17. See Simons, supra note 9, at 236. See also infra, notes 46-49 and
accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 68-77.
19. Jackson, 85 P.3d at 1043.
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These are the questions that this Article aims to illuminate, together
with the analogous questions that arise about one's awareness of the risk
when acting recklessly. In other words, this Article investigates the
connection requirement as applied to the mens rea of knowledge and
recklessness. While there has been substantial discussion of the
connection requirement as applied to intent,20 the meaning of this
requirement in the context of knowledge and recklessness crimes has
received far less attention. In this Article, I consider one of the few
sophisticated attempts to precisely spell out the requirement as applied to
knowledge and recklessness-namely, the counterfactual approach
offered by Ken Simons.2 1 However, I argue that this sort of approach
faces serious problems. In its place, I defend a different kind of
approach to the connection requirement-one that does not rely on
counterfactual tests, but rather places normative questions front and
center.
The order of business is as follows. Part I further elucidates the
connection requirement and explains why it is substantially harder to
give a satisfying account of this requirement for knowledge and
recklessness than it is for intent. Along the way, it will become clear that
knowledge and recklessness are structurally similar in ways that make
them subject not only to similar questions, but also to similar answers.
Part II explains an additional desideratum that accounts of the connection
requirement for knowledge and recklessness should satisfy-namely,
that it provide guidance in cases of latent or otherwise not-fully
conscious knowledge or risk-awareness. With the challenges to be met
thus more clearly in view, Part III proceeds to argue against Simons'
counterfactual approach to the connection requirement for knowledge
and recklessness. Finally, Part IV defends a distinct normative approach
to the requirement that helps avoid the problems for Simons' account.
20. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 8; DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 199-200;
Simons, supra note 9, at 235-47; Geoffrey Marston, Contemporaneity of Act
and Intention in Crimes, 86 L. Q. REV. 208 (1970); Alan White, The Identity and
Time of the Actus Reus, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 148 (1977); G. R. Sullivan, Cause
and the Contemporaneity of Actus Reus and Mens Rea, 52 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 487
(1993); Peter W. Edge, Contemporaneity and Moral Congruence: Actus Reus
and Mens Rea Reconsidered, 17 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 83 (1995); Stanley Yeo,
Causation, Fault and the Concurrence Principle, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 213 (2002).
Much of this literature concerns the relative timing of the mens rea and actus
reus, which is a particularly vexing issue because the result required for the
crime may not occur until well after the defendant's mens rea and conduct.
However, many of these problems relate to causation. See Marston supra note
20, at 218-19.
21. See Simons, supra note 9.
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I. THE CONNECTION REQUIREMENT GENERALLY AND THE SPECIAL
DIFFICULTY CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE AND RECKLESSNESS
A. General Features of the Connection Requirement
To start, consider an uncontroversial component of the connection
requirement. It is generally agreed that the requisite connection between
22mens rea and actus reus involves some kind of temporal concurrence.
At the very least, this means that one cannot be guilty of a crime if one
only acquires the requisite mens rea after performing the required actus
reus.23 For instance, "it is not robbery if the act of force or intimidation
by which the taking is accomplished precedes the formation of the
larcenous purpose."24 A similar point holds for knowledge crimes.25 As
Simons notes, "if D now knows that the package he delivered for E
contained illegal drugs, but came to this realization only after delivering
the package, he is not guilty of knowingly transporting illegal drugs."
26
Thus, to be guilty of a crime requiring knowledge of a particular fact, the
defendant at least had to possess the requisite knowledge during some
part of' 7 the performance of the actus reus of the crime (or perhaps the
22. LAFAVE, supra note 8 (noting that "it is sometimes assumed that there
cannot be such concurrence unless the mental and physical aspects exist at
precisely the same moment of time," though observing that this is not sufficient
for the requirement to be satisfied). See also DRESSLER, supra note 8 at 199-
200.
23. See, e.g., Marston supra note 20, at 232-33 (noting that conviction is
inappropriate "where the accused forms the mens rea after the completion of the
actus reus of the crime"); Simons, supra note 9, at 250 ("[I]f the actor acquires a
belief only after he completes the relevant act, the belief fails this 'connection'
requirement and is irrelevant to criminal liability.").
24. LAFAVE, supra note 8; see also People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 501 (1980),
abrogated on other grounds by People v. Martinez, 973 P.2d 512 (1999) ("We
conclude that like the nonviolent taking in larceny, the act of force or
intimidation by which the taking is accomplished in robbery must be motivated
by the intent to steal in order to satisfy the requirement of [California Penal
Code] section 20: if the larcenous purpose does not arise until after the force has
been used against the victim, there is no 'joint operation of act and intent'
necessary to constitute robbery." (emphasis added)).
25. For the criminal law definition of knowledge, see infra note 57.
26. Simons, supra note 9, at 232.
27. Here is the reason for including the phrase "some part of" the actus reus. As
Edge observes, "where the defendant has done all that he need to do during the
currency of the mens rea, the coincidence requirement is satisfied even if the
mens rea ceases to exist before the completion of the actus reus." Edge, supra
note 20, at 85. See also Marston, supra note 20, at 220 (discussing cases where
2015]
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lead-up to it or the preparation for it28). Likewise for recklessness
crimes:29 to be guilty of such a crime, the defendant had to be aware of
the relevant risk during some part of30 the actus reus (or perhaps its
preparation31).
There is a straightforward rationale for this rule that acquiring the
mens rea after the actus reus has been completed will not support a
conviction. If the defendant acquired the relevant mens rea, M, only
after doing the actus reus, then the defendant's possession of M cannot
32have been any part of what produced or actuated the actus reus. As a
result, the actus reus would not seem to manifest as much culpability as it
would have were it performed with the required mental state, M.
Still, although possessing the requisite mens rea while commencing
or carrying out the actus reus is generally necessary for conviction,3 3 it is
"the mens rea is formed after the commencement but before the end of the"
actus reus).
28. Jackson might seem to suggest that one's knowledge can be adequately
connected to the actus reus even if it was consciously entertained only in the
lead-up to or while preparing for the actus reus. The court noted in dicta that
"Jackson would be guilty of 'knowingly' failing to appear if he decided early on
that he would not attend his scheduled court appearances, and he then dismissed
the matter from his mind." Jackson v. State, 85 P.3d 1042, 1043 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2004). Nonetheless, it is not obvious that this would be a case in which the
defendant possesses the relevant knowledge before doing the actus reus, but not
during it. After all, even if Jackson had "dismissed the matter from his mind"
on the date he was scheduled to be in court, he still plausibly would have
possessed the knowledge of his court date at least latently. Even if he did not
consciously attend to this knowledge while failing to appear, he nonetheless still
would possess the knowledge.
Accordingly, I take no official stand on whether it is possible for knowledge to
be adequately connected to the actus reus if this knowledge is possessed only
before, but not during, the performance of the actus reus. I don't wish to
foreclose the possibility that knowledge might be part of what actuates the
defendant's performance of the actus reus, even if the defendant no longer
possesses this knowledge when he actually goes on to perform it. But I also
cannot confidently assert that this does occur. More conceptual work is needed
to settle the matter conclusively.
29. For the criminal law definition of recklessness, see infra note 59.
30. Cf supra note 27.
31. Cf supra note 28.
32. See LAFAVE, supra note 8 (noting that in cases where "the bad state of mind
follows the physical conduct.., it is obvious that the subsequent mental state is in
no sense legally related to the prior acts or omissions of the defendant"). Cf.
People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 501 (1980).
33. One possible exception is a
case in which A decides to kill B, and then voluntarily becomes intoxicated for
the purpose of nerving himself for the accomplishment of his plan, and then,
[Vol. 120:1
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clearly not sufficient to satisfy the connection requirement.34  Crimes
requiring the mens rea of intent most easily illustrate the point. Consider
an example from Simons (slightly simplified).3  Suppose Bill is driving
to his uncle's house intending to shoot and kill him. While driving, Bill
is consumed with thoughts of how nice it will be to have his uncle dead,
which results in Bill not paying adequate attention to the road. As a
result of his careless driving, he negligently hits and kills a pedestrian
who happens to be his uncle.36 In this case, Bill would not be guilty of
murder, even though he possesses the requisite mens rea-i.e. the intent
to kill his uncle-at the same time as his conduct that causes the death of
his intended victim. The explanation for this is that the connection
requirement is not satisfied. The conduct of Bill's that results in his
uncle's death, while temporally concurrent with Bill's intention to kill
while intoxicated, kills B. Assuming that A had the required mental state prior
to intoxication, but then became so intoxicated as to be unable to have such a
mental state, is he guilty of murder? Most courts have said yes.
LAFAVE, supra note 8 (internal citations omitted). One possible reading of this
case is that the connection requirement was not satisfied when A performed the
act that resulted in B's death. Nonetheless, it's also plausible that the
connection requirement would be satisfied if getting drunk was the intended
means by which A sought to secure B's death. If so, then A would at least have
the required intent to kill during some part of the conduct intended to culminate
in B's death-i.e. when he commences that course of conduct. Accordingly, one
might also argue that the connection requirement is indeed satisfied in this case.
The trickier case is the one in which A got blackout drunk by accidentally
drinking too much, and then killed B in some unforeseen way. Then it is far
from clear that the connection requirement is satisfied. Perhaps courts would
convict on the theory that voluntary intoxication is no defense under such
circumstances. However, one might fairly question whether this would be a
theoretically sound result.
34. See LAFAVE, supra note 8 (noting that "[a]lthough it is sometimes assumed
that there cannot be such concurrence unless the mental and physical aspects
exist at precisely the same moment of time, ... mere coincidence in point of time
is not necessarily sufficient"); see also DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 199-201
(noting that in addition to temporal concurrence, what he calls "motivational
concurrence" is also required).
35. Simons, supra note 9, at 232. See also Marston, supra note 20, at 232
(discussing the same hypothetical).
36. Simons' original example (which he, in turn, culls from Searle) might be
explained away by appeal to the voluntary act requirement. In the initial
example, the car accident happens because Bill is "so nervous and excited that
he accidentally runs over" his uncle. Simons, supra note 9, at 232. But this
might make it sound as though the accident was caused by Bill's hands shaking
or the like, in which case it would be questionable whether the death was caused
by voluntary conduct. I endeavored to tell the story in a way that avoids this
worry.
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his uncle, is not the execution of that intention. That is, his negligent
driving is not undertaken in -order to, or as a means to, accomplishing his
goal or purpose of killing his uncle (which, in turn, he might desire as an
end in itself or as a means to something else he wants, say, inheritance
money).
It is in part because of cases like this that Wayne LaFave concludes
that the required connection between actus reus and mens rea is not
primarily a matter of temporal concurrence; rather, "the better view," he
argues, is that the requirement is satisfied "when the defendant's mental
state actuates the physical conduct."37 In this, I think he is correct.38 In a
similar vein, Dressler observes that "[t]he defendant's conduct that
caused the social harm must have been set into motion or impelled by the
thought process that constituted the mens rea of the offense.39 Simons'
view, too, is similar to LaFave's and Dressler's, but he helpfully puts
some additional meat on the bones of this idea. He observes that the
defendant's intent to kill must connect to his conduct-i.e. actuate it-in
the following way in order for the connection requirement to be satisfied:
(a) When he acted, D believed that his actions could bring about V's
death,
(b) V's death is what D desired or planned, and
(c) D took those actions in order to bring about, or as part of a plan to
bring about, V's death.
40
In Bill's case, prong (c) is not satisfied. His careless driving was
not undertaken in order to, or as an execution of his intent to, kill his
uncle.
The failure of the connection requirement to be satisfied in this case
also has implications for the culpability of Bill's conduct. The claim that
the connection requirement is not satisfied in Bill's case is just another
way to say that Bill's intention to kill his uncle was not expressed in the
conduct that in fact caused his uncle's death. And because this intention
was not expressed in his conduct, the conduct did not manifest the
amount of culpability normally associated with an intentional killing.
The basis for this conclusion is a particular theory of culpability, which
37. LAFAVE, supra note 8.
38. The Jackson court agreed. See Jackson v. State, 85 P.3d 1042, 1043, n.4
(Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (citing 1 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 6.3(a) and formulating the connection requirement in terms of actuation).
39. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 199 (emphasis added).
40. Simons, supra note 9, at 236.
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Simons is sympathetic to41 and which I assume for purposes of this
paper:
Insufficient Regard Theory: The degree to which a particular action
is culpable equals the degree to which that action manifests
insufficient regard for others or their legitimately protected interests
(or ill will, for short).
42
How does this theory relate to the connection requirement? If a
particular mental state, M, of the actor's is not appropriately connected to
his action, A, then A will not manifest the amount of insufficient regard
that A would have manifested were it appropriately connected to M.
Because Bill's conduct was not appropriately connected to his intention
to kill his uncle, this conduct did not manifest the amount of insufficient
regard, and thus culpability, that it would have done had he behaved the
same way and the connection requirement were satisfied. Instead, his
actual conduct was at most negligent with respect to his uncle's death,
and so this conduct would at worst manifest the amount of insufficient
regard associated with negligent homicide. (More must obviously be
said about what it is for an action to manifest a particular amount of
insufficient regard, and I will clarify the matter further in Part III.)
For purposes of this Article, I have no quarrel with Simons',
LaFave's, or Dressler's claims about the connection requirement when it
41. This is evident, for example, in Simons' discussion of the culpability of
"[t]he torturer who leaves the victim to die, and the Russian roulette player who
willingly imposes a one in six chance of death for a personal thrill, each [of
whom] displays grossly insufficient concern for the interests of their victims."
Simons, supra note 9, at 261 (emphasis added). Simons' sympathy for the
present view of culpability is also apparent in his explanation of the culpability
of knowing or reckless misconduct in general:
If a person acts despite his belief that he is likely to cause harm, or despite his
belief that he has created a significant risk of harm (or if he acts despite his
belief that an inculpatory circumstance is likely or is a substantial risk), then his
culpability arises from his failure to give sufficient weight to that consideration
in his conduct.
Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
42. See also NOMY ARPALY & TIM SCHROEDER, IN PRAISE OF DESIRE 170
(2013) ("[A] person is blameworthy for a wrong action A to the extent that A
manifests ill will (or moral indifference) through being rationalized by it"). This
theory is also roughly equivalent to the theory that an action is culpable to the
degree that it displays the actor's faulty modes of recognition and response to
reasons. GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 38 (2011) (discussing the theory that
conduct deserves censure (or blame) if and only if "it is a product of a faulty
mode of recognition or response to reasons for action").
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comes to intent.43 Instead, what the remainder of the Article investigates
is the connection requirement as applied to knowledge and recklessness.
The reason for this focus is that getting a fix on the connection
requirement for these two mental states turns out to be significantly more
difficult than it is for intent.44
B. Why the Requirement Is Trickier for Knowledge and Recklessness:
Desideratum 1
Whence the extra difficulty concerning knowledge and
recklessness? To start, note that it's fairly clear what it means for the
mental state of intent to actuate some bit of physical conduct, to use
LaFave's term.45 Roughly, the conduct must be the execution of an
intention one has, i.e. something done as a means to an end one
possesses. However, it is far less obvious what it is for knowledge or
46
recklessness to actuate, produce or issue in some bit of conduct.
Granted, a knowing or reckless wrongdoer is often said to act "despite"
43. Others have extensively discussed additional complications concerning the
connection requirement as applied to intent. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
44. Formulating the connection requirement for negligence is likely to be yet
more difficult, and so I set aside that task for later. George Sher's excellent
book on related questions offers an account of responsibility for negligent action
that goes a long way towards specifying the conditions that must be met for a
particular action to be appropriately connected to one's negligent mental state in
order for that action to manifest insufficient concern for the interests of others
(although he does not discuss the problem precisely in terms of the connection
requirement). See GEORGE SHER, WHO KNEW? RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT
AWARENESS 85-95, 141-54 (2009); see also Simons, supra note 9, at 257-59.
45. LAFAVE, supra note 8.
46. A similar point applies to Dressler's claim that "[t]he defendant's conduct
that caused the social harm must have been set into motion or impelled by the
thought process that constituted the mens rea of the offense." DRESSLER, supra
note 8, at 199 (emphasis added). What does it mean for a mental state like
knowledge or recklessness to "set into motion" or "impel" the conduct of the
defendant? It would be clear what this means if the knowledge or recklessness
in question involved an instrumental belief of the form if 1perform the actus
reus, I know (or believe there is a substantial chance) that I will accomplish my
goal G. But in the vast majority of cases, the knowledge required for conviction
of a knowledge crime, or the risk one must be aware of to be guilty of a
recklessness crime, does not involve an instrumental belief of this kind. Thus,
the question remains as to how a mental state like knowledge or recklessness
can be part of the motivational force behind the defendant's performance of the
actus reus. I answer this question in Part IV of this paper.
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his knowledge or his awareness of a risk.47 But this merely restates in
different terms the puzzling idea to be explained.
The challenge in explaining what is involved in knowledge or
recklessness producing some bit of conduct is compounded by the fact
that the traditional tools of action theory initially seem to come up short.
In the core case where a defendant commits a crime that requires
knowledge of some fact, or awareness of some risk, the defendant's
conduct clearly will be performed for some reason or other. If I
knowingly receive stolen property, for example, this will involve my
performing some bit of voluntary conduct-say, picking up the goods I
know to be stolen and putting them in the trunk of my car-and it will be
the case that I do this for some reason-say, to get the financial benefits
of possessing these goods. Let "R" designate the reason for which I act
here. Following a venerable tradition in action theory, we may take this
reason, R, to consist of the considerations that, together with one's
desires and other instrumental beliefs, rationalize this action and non-
deviantly cause it in virtue of rationalizing it.48 What appears odd,
though, is that my culpable knowledge in this case-i.e. that the goods
are stolen-does not figure into the reason for which I performed the
conduct in question (i.e. for which I put the goods in my car). How,
then, can this piece of knowledge be active in producing my conduct?
Only if this knowledge is part of what produces or actuates my conduct
would it seem to be connected to that conduct in a way that allows this
knowledge to help determine the amount of culpability my conduct
manifests.
As a result, one central question that our account of the connection
requirement should answer is how one's knowledge of a fact, or
awareness of a risk, can be causally active in producing a particular
action (i.e. actuate it), and the account should explain how this is
possible even though the knowledge or risk-awareness does not directly
figure into the reason for which that action was done. Providing such an
47. See, e.g., Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S.
CAL. L. REv. 953, 967 (1998) ("What makes the knowing actor morally culpable
is her action connected with her knowledge. It is the action in spite of the
knowledge."); Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92
BOSTON UNIV. L. REv. 1, 16 (2012) (noting that "we hold [a knowing or
reckless actor] responsible for her willingness to act notwithstanding her belief
that her actions will or might cause harm").
48. See ARPALY & SCHROEDER, supra note 42. On their view, "[t]o think or act
for a reason is for the event of one's thinking or acting to be caused (or
appropriately causally explained) by one's other attitudes in virtue of the fact
that these attitudes [i.e. their contents] rationalize (to some extent) the thought or
action." (emphasis omitted) Id. at 62.
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explanation, I'll say, is Desideratum 1 for an account of the connection
requirement for knowledge and recklessness.49  The account of the
connection requirement I will offer in Part IV of this article aims to
provide the sort of explanation that is needed to satisfy Desideratum 1.
Two clarifications before proceeding. First, I assume the answer to
the question behind Desideratum 1 should ideally fall within the causalist
tradition in action theory-i.e. it should illuminate how knowledge or
risk-awareness can be among the causes of an action.0 The reason for
this is not just that the causalist tradition is arguably the dominant
approach in contemporary action theory;51 in addition, this approach is
suggested by LaFave's talk of the need for the mens rea to "actuate" the
actus reus.52  The second clarification is that, while satisfying
Desideratum 1 requires saying what sort of causal connection satisfies
the connection requirement, it will not do to just stipulate that so-called
"deviant causation"53 prevents the requirement from being satisfied. It
appears there can be cases of deviant causation involving knowledge
where the connection requirement intuitively is satisfied.54
49. We need not posit a similar desideratum for accounts of the connection
requirement for intent because it is relatively clear what's involved in an
intention actively producing an action: the action must be the execution of some
relevant intention. Cf Simons, supra note 9, at 236.
50. This tradition, which traces back to Davidson's seminal work on intentional
action, takes it (roughly) that explanations of a person's actions in terms of her
reasons for so-acting are a species of causal explanation. See generally DONALD
DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (1980); JESUS H. AGUILAR &
ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF, EDS., CAUSING HUMAN ACTIONS: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON THE CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION (2010).
51. "[T]he view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations
remains the dominant position." G. Wilson and S. Shpall, Action, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (2012),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012 /entries/action/.
52. See LAFAVE, supra note 8. Not only is some kind of causalist explanation
suggested by LaFave's talk of "actuation," but the same is also supported by
Dressler's talk of the defendant's conduct being "set into motion or impelled by
the thought process that constituted the mens rea of the offense." DRESSLER,
supra note 8, at 199.
53. See, e.g., ROWLAND STOUT, Deviant Causal Chains, in A COMPANION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 159 (Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis
eds., 2010); DAVIDSON, supra note 50, at 79.
54. Here is one such case. (I am grateful to Erik Encarnacion for suggesting it.)
Suppose Fred gets a thrill from starting fires that he believes to be highly likely
to lead to another person's death. Thus, he will only start the fire if he believes
it highly likely that someone will be inside the building he intends to bum down
and will die in the fire. He will not start a fire if he's pretty sure that someone
won't be in the building. Moreover, he does not directly desire or intend
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II. FURTHER DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CONNECTION REQUIREMENT
FOR KNOWLEDGE AND RECKLESSNESS: LATENT KNOWLEDGE OR
RISK-AWARENESS
In addition to Desideratum 1, this Part introduces a second
desideratum that our account of the connection requirement should
satisfy. In particular, as I will explain, the account should accommodate
cases of latent or otherwise not-fully-conscious knowledge or risk-
awareness. As Simons notes:
[T]he requirement does become problematic in those frequent
situations when the actor has only latent awareness of a relevant risk
or fact, or when the actor acquires his belief well in advance of the
criminal act, and then, because of forgetfulness, distraction, or
preoccupation, fails to access that prior belief when he acts.
55
Desideratum 2, then, is that our account enables us to plausibly
distinguish cases involving not-fully-conscious knowledge or risk-
awareness where the connection requirement is satisfied from cases of
this type where the requirement is not satisfied.
To show the force of this challenge, it will be helpful to explain in
detail why mere temporal concurrence is not sufficient to satisfy the
anyone's death. He desires and intends only to risk the death of another. The
explanation for all this is that, under Fred's peculiar psychology, he cannot get
the thrill he seeks unless he satisfies the law's knowledge requirement, but he'll
get the thrill only if he's in that epistemic state.
One day Fred approaches the building he plans to set alight, his knowledge of
the person in the building makes him very excited. As a result, while in the
process of sabotaging the wiring in the building to start the fire, his excitement
owing to the belief that someone in building causes him to get distracted and he
is careless in his sabotage effort. Thus, the wiring happens to catch fire in an
unexpected way. The fire starts prematurely and only bums down the west wing
of the building, where Fred believed someone to be present. The fire kills the
person in the west wing.
Fred is guilty of murder. After all, he has knowledge that his conduct will cause
a death and it did. Nonetheless, there is only a very attenuated causal
connection between his knowledge and the death. This is a classic case of so-
called "deviant causation," that is, a case where one accomplishes what one set
out to do but only in an accidental or freakish way.
Despite this deviant causal connection between Fred's knowledge and his
conduct, there is a strong basis for taking Fred to be guilty of murder-a crime
for which knowledge suffices. Thus, we need an explanation of why such a case
of deviant causation apparently suffices for being guilty of a knowledge crime.
My account in Part IV will explain why the connection requirement is indeed
satisfied in the case of Fred.
55. Simons, supra note 9, at 248.
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connection requirement for knowledge or recklessness. The central
reason why temporal concurrence does not suffice (as we will see) is that
it is possible for a person, while acting, to possess the required piece of
knowledge, or awareness of the relevant risk, even though that
knowledge or risk-awareness is not a relevant part of what produced (or
actuated) the defendant's conduct. I will say that such mental states are
not expressed in action. One aim of this Part, therefore, is to show that
there are cases in which the actor genuinely possesses the mental state of
knowledge or recklessness while acting, but that mental state remains
unexpressed-i.e. the connection requirement is not satisfied. Let me
first clarify what the mental states of knowledge and recklessness are
before explaining how they might fail, even when present, to be
expressed in action.
A. Clarifying Knowledge and Recklessness
The mental states of knowledge and recklessness can both be
modeled as cognitive states (or simply beliefs) concerning the probability
that a particular inculpatory proposition is true.56 In other words, they
can be understood in terms of one's degree of subjective certainty or
confidence in the truth of the inculpatory proposition. The inculpatory
proposition will generally be the claim that some element of the crime
obtains-whether this is that some result will ensue (e.g. death), that
some attendant circumstance is present (e.g. that the building one enters
is a dwelling), or that one's conduct is of a particular nature (e.g. illegal).
Accordingly, knowledge in the criminal law consists in possessing a
degree of confidence in the inculpatory proposition that is high enough to
count as "practical certainty," or seeing its truth as "highly probable,"
provided the inculpatory proposition also is in fact true.57 (Note that this
is notion of knowledge is significantly weaker than the one used by
56. See Alexander Sarch, Willful Ignorance, Culpability and the Criminal Law,
88 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1023, 1031-1034 (2014).
57. On the Model Penal Code (MPC) definition, "[a] person acts knowingly
with respect to a material element of an offense" when he is "aware" or
"practically certain" that the element obtains (depending on what sort of element
it is). MPC § 2.02(2)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). The
MPC further clarifies that "[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it
does not exist." MPC § 2.02(7) (emphasis added). More simply, as Robin
Charlow explains, in the criminal law "knowledge requires both belief, or
subjective certainty, and the actual truth or existence of the thing known."
Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1351, 1375 (1992).
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philosophers.58) Recklessness, then, differs from knowledge mainly in
that it does not require having as high a degree of confidence that the
relevant material element obtains-i.e. one does not have to see the truth
of the inculpatory proposition as "highly probable" or a "practical
certainty." Instead, for recklessness, it suffices that one acts despite
being aware of a "substantial" probability that the relevant material
element obtains, provided the risk of its obtaining is unjustified.5 9
As several legal scholars have noted, one's estimate of the
probability that a material element obtains (i.e. one's subjective
confidence in the inculpatory proposition) does not have to be
consciously attended to when acting.60 For example, I can be aware that
my speeding down a crowded city street poses a substantial and
unjustified risk of death even if I am not currently thinking to myself, or
consciously attending to the fact, that my driving is likely to kill
someone. Instead, I might simply be peripherally or pre-consciously
aware of the risk of death I am imposing, feel it in my gut, or otherwise
possess the relevant subjective confidence of the risk without this being
the content of an occurrent thought at the time. Perhaps my only
occurrent thought is that the street is crowded.
B. How Knowledge and Recklessness Can Be Actually Present During
the Actus Reus but Remain Unexpressed
Now we are in a better position to see how such mental states,
which the defendant possesses at the time of her action, nonetheless
58. In the epistemology literature, knowledge is typically taken to require i)
justified ii) true iii) belief, plus iv) some additional condition designed to get
around so-called "Gettier counterexamples." Cf. Jonathan J. Ichikawa and
Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
("Most epistemologists have accepted Gettier's argument, taking it to show that
the three conditions of the JTB account-truth, belief, and justification-are not
in general sufficient for knowledge.").
59. "A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct." MPC § 2.02(2)(c).
60. See Douglas N. Husak, Distraction and Negligence, in,PRINCIPLES AND
VALUES IN CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
ANDREW ASHWORTH 81, 85 (Lucia Zedner & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2d ed.
2012) ("It is clear that defendants need not have an explicit thought about the
risk before their conscious minds in order to be reckless. In other words,
reckless persons need not be saying to themselves 'this is risky' when they
inflict injury. (...) [F]ew of us would ever be reckless if we needed to rehearse
such thoughts at the moment we cause harm.").
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
might fail to be expressed in that action. This, in turn, shows why
possessing the mens rea of knowledge or recklessness while performing
the actus reus is not sufficient to satisfy the connection requirement. In
order to establish this point, I will sketch a hypothetical case involving
latent knowledge.6' (A similar point could also be made about latent
risk-awareness. But given the similarities between knowledge and
recklessness, it is easy to see how that would go. So the discussion
focuses just on knowledge.)
Note that I could also have made the present point using a variation
on the facts of Jackson, in which the defendant fails to appear in court
only because he receives some shock to his system that renders his
62knowledge merely latent or insalient. However, Jackson involves an
omission-i.e. the failure to appear-which might seem to be a
complicating factor.63 Accordingly, the hypothetical I rely on involves
overt action, not omission.
Consider, then, Frank the fund manager. Frank's business involves
collecting investments from private investors and passing them through
to larger investment managers. One morning, an analyst in his employ
shows him strong evidence that Bernie, one of the investment managers
with whom Frank is considering investing his clients' funds, is
perpetrating a massive fraud. Frank resolves not to have any further
dealings with Bernie. However, that afternoon, as Frank is about to
approve or reject the transfers from his clients' funds to different
investment managers (including Bernie), Frank receives word that his
family has been in a terrible car accident. He is stunned. As he is about
to rush to the hospital, his callous supervisor tells him that he must sign
the documents concerning the transfers of funds before he can leave.
Frank, distressed to distraction, quickly signs the documents approving
all of the transfers, including one to Bernie. While signing, Frank has the
sneaking suspicion that there was an issue with one of the transfers, and
that it might be a bad idea to approve them all, but in his distracted state
he simply rushes ahead. Frank had not forgotten or otherwise lost access
to his knowledge of Bernie's fraud, but the shocking news sent him
reeling in such a way that the knowledge was no longer salient for him.
Still, had Frank stopped to consider for one moment, he would have
61. See infra notes 68-77.
62. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
63. The metaphysics and ethics of omissions are notoriously tricky. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Schaffer, Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to Their Effects:
The Case for Negative Causation, 197-216, Christopher Hitchcock (ed.),
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES N PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (2004),
http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/negcause.pdf.
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recalled Bernie's fraud and would not have approved the transfer of
funds to him.64
Is Frank guilty of aiding and abetting Bernie's fraud? This crime
requires not only an intentional act in aid of the principal wrongdoer's
conduct (i.e. Frank's approval of the transfer to Bernie), but also the
knowledge that the underlying crime is being committed.65 Here, Frank
in some sense knows that Bernie is engaged in a fraud. If prompted,
Frank would instantly agree that he is practically certain that Bernie's
investment activities are fraudulent. Frank has not completely forgotten
the analyst's warning from that morning or otherwise lost access to the
information. Rather, because of his distress, he simply failed to attend to
this knowledge at the time. It lost the salience for him that it would have
had under normal conditions. Accordingly, Frank's distress blocked the
knowledge from playing the role in his deliberations and actions that it
would have played under normal circumstances. Thus, even though
Frank knew at the time he acted in aid of Bernie's crime that Bernie was
perpetrating a fraud, this knowledge does not seem appropriately
connected to Frank's action. That is, the knowledge is not connected to
his action in a way that demonstrates that he gave too little weight to the
existence of the fraud or otherwise reveals that he was insufficiently
concerned with the interests of the victims of the fraud. As Simons
explains, in cases like this:
the actor who at some point in the past possessed a legally relevant
belief and now encounters the risk does not necessarily reveal the
presumptive culpability characteristic of knowing actors-namely,
that their actions show that they give far too little weight to a highly
probable harm in their practical reasoning and action. Rather, in such
cases, the actor fails (for some reason) to give the risk any weight at
all.
66
64. An even more extreme version of this example might be one in which Frank
was himself subject to some traumatic experience-perhaps he was in a car
accident himself on the way back from a meeting, but before being allowed to
go to the hospital, he was forced to sign the documents. Still, receiving news
that one's family was in an accident should itself be an example of a sufficiently
egregious shock to make the point in question here.
65. Under federal law, whoever "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures" a crime "is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). The U.S.
Supreme Court recently noted that it had "previously found [the] intent
requirement [for aiding and abetting] satisfied when a person actively
participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances
constituting the charged offense." Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240,
1248-49 (2014).
66. See Simons, supra note 9, at 252.
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Accordingly, since the connection requirement does not seem to be
satisfied as between Frank's knowledge and his action in aid of Bernie's
crime, we have reason to conclude that Frank should not be guilty as an
aider and abettor.
C. A Worry: When Is Latent Knowledge Really Knowledge?
Now, the obvious objection to this line of reasoning is to say that if
Frank is not guilty of aiding and abetting Bernie's crime, this is only
because Frank does not actually possess knowledge of Bernie's crime at
the time Frank does his act in aid of it. It is not, as I claimed, because
Frank's knowledge, though possessed concurrently with his action, is not
appropriately connected to that action.67
Nonetheless, this objection is unconvincing. Even if it might be
prudent for defense counsel to claim that Frank did not possess actual
knowledge of the fraud at the time he signed the transfers (after all, the
connection requirement is a relatively unfamiliar doctrine), the fact
remains that any plausible account of knowledge possession would have
to count Frank as actually knowing of Bernie's fraud while signing the
transfers. The argument I will offer for this claim is that Frank's
knowledge of the fraud is a form of latent knowledge, which
uncontroversially can constitute actual knowledge and be manifested in
action. If latent knowledge can indeed constitute actual knowledge, then
Frank's knowledge of the fraud likewise counts as actual knowledge.
Accordingly, the best way to understand the case is to say that Frank's
actual knowledge of the fraud is blocked, screened off or rendered non-
67. Another possible objection is that perhaps Frank is not guilty of aiding and
abetting only because he is excused, not because (as I claimed) the connection
requirement fails to be satisfied. (Thanks to Steven Schaus for this objection.)
However, one might describe the fact that the connection requirement is not
satisfied to be one type of excusing or otherwise exculpating factor. (After all, it
is not merely a mitigator that supports giving a lesser sentence.) One might
object that it is usually the defendant's burden to prove an excuse, not the
prosecution's burden to prove the absence of an excuse. And when it comes to
the connection requirement, it is the prosecution's burden to prove that it is
satisfied-thus making the connection requirement like an element of the crime.
That would be a problem for my claim that the connection requirement being
unsatisfied looks like an excuse. Nonetheless, it is in fact not a problem
because, plausibly, in most cases we just presume that the connection
requirement is satisfied, and it is only if the defendant raises the claim that it's
not satisfied that the issue is ever litigated. (Granted, that does not mean that it
is formally the defendant's burden to prove that the connection requirement is
unsatisfied, but in practice matters seem to work in a way that is quite close to
this.)
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salient by his distraction, such that this knowledge is not appropriately
connected to, or expressed in, his act in aid of Bernie's fraud. Or so I
will argue.
To make good on this argument, begin by noting that the morning
Frank was told of Bernie's fraud, he clearly had knowledge. Moreover,
in the afternoon (when Frank received the shocking news about his
family), Frank had not lost the ability to access this information. Even
after being told of his family's accident, Frank still could easily have
brought the information to consciousness if prompted or if simply given
the opportunity to calmly reflect for a moment. He remains able to use
this knowledge in deciding how to act (at least under normal
circumstances). Accordingly, Frank's access to this information is just
like our access to a great deal of the beliefs we possess, but to which we
do not consciously attend or which do not figure into the content of an
occurent thought.
Such knowledge is often dubbed latent knowledge,68 and it is a
pervasive phenomenon. To borrow some examples from Simons, if I
loaded my gun this morning, it is plausible that I:
'know' that the gun is loaded, not in the sense of vivid current
conscious awareness of this fact, but in the straightforward sense that
I would readily concede the fact if I were asked and were to reply
honestly. In the latter sense, I 'know' that 2+2 =4, and that [Barack
Obama] is our current President, even when those beliefs are not
conscious, and are not occupying my thoughts.
69
Likewise, Doug Husak mentions a "marksman who fires his
weapon at a distant target," and although he "does not think to himself 'I
might miss'," he nonetheless knows he might.7°
I submit that in these examples, the respective individuals know the
relevant propositions-even though they are not consciously attending to
these propositions at the time. Here is why. Criminal law takes
knowledge to be, essentially, true belief.71 The truth of the propositions
68. See, e.g., Alan James MacFadyen, Beliefs in Behavioral and Neoclassical
Economics, in HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS:
FOUNDATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS (Morris Altman ed. 2006) 183, 185-86
(discussing ways in which the term "belief' might be "applied to something that
lies hidden in the unconscious" and using the term "latent belief' to denote
"unconscious beliefs that would be recognized as beliefs if brought to our
attention").
69. Simons, supra note 9, at 251.
70. Husak, supra note 60, at 85.
71. As Robin Charlow explains, in the criminal law "knowledge requires both
belief, or subjective certainty, and the actual truth or existence of the thing
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in the examples quoted above is assumed, so the subjects know the
relevant propositions if and only if they believe them. While it is
notoriously difficult to specify the precise conditions in which a person,
S, counts as believing that p, any adequate theory of belief would regard
the people in these examples as believing the relevant propositions.72 As
Husak explains, the standard analysis of belief is dispositional.73 That is,
a person believes that p "when he has the disposition to behave in given
ways" that are characteristic of believing that p, "most notably when he
has the disposition to assent to utterances of p in the right sorts of
circumstance ([e.g.] when he comprehends the language, has no stake in
deception, and the like). 74  Others have defended more sophisticated
dispositional accounts,75 while still others prefer non-dispositional
known." Charlow, supra note 57, at 1374-75 (1992) (observing that "criminal
knowledge is correct belief').
72. See Husak, supra note 60, at 85 (noting that contemporary epistemologists
"have said disappointingly little about" the conditions under which S believes p,
but observing that "an adequate analysis ... would support the conclusion that
our marksman is well aware of the risk of missing his target-even though his
belief is not occurrent").
73. See id. at 85.
74. Id. at 85-87. See generally Douglas N. Husak, Negligence, Belief Blame
and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 199,
210-14 (2011). Note that Husak's question in these two papers is different from
the question I am concemned with here. Husak aims to answer the question of
when latent belief-whether it involves distraction or forgetting or something
else-suffices for actual knowledge (in the case of a latent practical certainty) or
recklessness (in the case of a latent awareness of a substantial risk), as opposed
to plain negligence. By contrast, my question concerns cases in which we are
already confident that latent belief does amount to actual knowledge or
recklessness: in such cases, when should we regard the connection requirement
as satisfied and when should we regard it as unsatisfied? An overriding aim of
the present Part, then, is to argue that there can be instances in which latent
belief does amount to actual knowledge, but the connection requirement still is
not satisfied. (The case of Frank is one such instance.)
75. See Eric Schwitzgebel, In-Between Believing, 51 PHIL. Q. 76, 76-81 (2001)
(arguing that to determine if an unclear case genuinely counts as belief, one
should look to the extent to which the individual possesses a sufficient degree of
the stereotypical dispositions that are characteristic of belief, "the greater the
proportion of stereotypical dispositions a person possesses, and the more central
these are to the stereotype, the more appropriate it is to describe him as having
the belief in question."). See also Eric Schwitzgebel, Acting Contrary to Our
Professed Beliefs, or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional
Belief 91 PAC. PHIL. Q. 531, 533-36 (2010) [hereinafter Schwitzgebel (2010)]
(discussing cases of "in-between" belief); Ruth Marcus, Some Revisionary
Proposals about Belief and Believing, 50 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
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approaches.76 I take no stand on what the correct analysis of belief is. I
note only that on whatever account proves correct, the individuals in the
examples quoted above will count as believing the relevant propositions.
After all, they possess the required dispositions-e.g. they would assent
to the relevant propositions in the right circumstances, they would tend to
behave as if the propositions were true, etc. Accordingly, because the
individuals in the quoted examples believe the relevant propositions, and
they are actually true, they have knowledge of these propositions in the
criminal law sense.
In general, then, I will use the term "latent knowledge" to denote
the mental state S bears towards p when: (1) despite not occurrently
believing that p, (2) S nonetheless possesses enough subjective
confidence in p to qualify as believing that p according to whatever
dispositional account of belief proves correct, and (3) p really is true.77
"Latent risk-awareness" can be understood analogously.
Not only is it possible to have actual knowledge of a proposition
despite believing it only latently, but such latent knowledge clearly can
also be active in producing action. To take a simple example, suppose I
sleep through my alarm and see when I wake that the time is 8:30 a.m. I
know I have to be at work by 9 a.m. or face a penalty, which I want to
avoid. Still, suppose all I can think about that morning are various
excuses I might tell my boss. Nonetheless, the belief that (together with
the relevant desires) motivates me to hurry out the door is the belief that I
will be penalized for being late unless I rush to work. The belief that I
will be penalized for being late is thus latent in the relevant sense,
although it clearly plays a central role in producing and explaining my
actions. Less banal examples are also easy to come by. Consider my
belief that speeding down a crowded city street is virtually certain to
133, 133-53 (1990) (arguing that believing that p is to act in relevant
circumstances as if p were true); David Hunter, Alienated Belief, 65 DIALECTICA
221,238 (2011) (arguing that to believe that p "is to be disposed to act and react
in ways that would advance one's plans and achieve one's goals if P were the
case").
76. See Schwitzgebel (2010), supra note 75, at 535-36 (discussing functionalist,
representationalist and interpretationist accounts of belief possession).
77. Latent knowledge thus is similar in some ways to what Ferzan discusses
under the heading of "preconscious awareness." See Kimberly K. Ferzan,
Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597, 629-30 (2001)
(noting that vague awareness might be "preconscious in the sense of easily
called to mind if attention is focused on it," which means it "remains part of a
person's mental states"; observing that the phenomenon often is present "when
someone is driving, [such that] many of his actions are part of his preconscious"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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harm someone. Suppose I don't formulate any thought to the effect that
my speeding is likely to harm anyone-perhaps all I think is "boy, this
street is sure crowded." Still, if I keep driving down the busy street, no
one would dispute that my action was done while possessing actual
knowledge that my conduct is virtually certain to harm someone. And
this is so even though that particular proposition-my conduct is certain
to harm someone-is merely the object of latent knowledge.
Now, the crucial point for present purposes is that Frank's
awareness of Bernie's fraud qualifies as latent knowledge in just this
sense. After all, according to whatever account of belief possession turns
out to be correct, Frank would count as believing that the fraud exists,
and this belief is true. For Frank has the dispositions characteristic of
believing that the fraud is afoot. If prompted, or even if simply given the
opportunity to reflect for a moment, Frank would easily be able to call to
consciousness his belief that Bernie is almost certainly engaged in a
fraud. Thus, if my belief that I will be penalized for being late to work,
or my belief that my speeding is certain to harm a pedestrian, can count
as actual knowledge, then Frank's knowledge of Bernie's fraud likewise
should count as actual knowledge.
Accordingly, on the reading of the case I am defending, Frank
actually knew of the fraud at the time he signed the transfer. It was only
the understandable preoccupation with the lives of his family that
prevented the knowledge from triggering a motivating reason not to
authorize the transfer of funds to Bernie. Consequently, Frank's
knowledge was not appropriately connected to his act of approving the
transfer for that action to manifest the insufficient regard normally
associated with knowingly aiding and abetting a massive fraud. If this
reading of the case is right, then we have reason to conclude that mere
temporal concurrence between the mens rea of knowledge and the actus
reus is not enough to satisfy the connection requirement.
D. Desideratum 2: How to Sort Cases ofLatent Knowledge?
One upshot of the above discussion is that we will need to formulate
the connection requirement for knowledge so as to capture the result that
Frank's knowledge of Bernie's fraud is not appropriately connected to
his action of approving the transfer. Nonetheless, it is equally clear that
in very many cases involving distraction, forgetfulness or latent
knowledge generally, the connection requirement will be satisfied. For
instance, if the cause of Frank's distraction were merely that he was
hungry, or preoccupied by ogling an attractive coworker, it is doubtful
that anyone would think the connection requirement unsatisfied. Such
cognitive impairments do not appear to be sufficiently extreme or
[Vol. 120:1
KNOWLEDGE, RECKLESSNESS AND THE CONNECTION
egregious to prevent a normal person's knowledge of something as
important as the existence of a fraud from being triggered and thus
preventing him from aiding that fraud. Therefore, the challenge in
formulating the connection requirement for knowledge is to devise a rule
that lets us separate (i) cases of latent knowledge, distraction and
forgetfulness where the defendant's knowledge is appropriately
connected to her conduct from (ii) cases of these kinds where the
knowledge is not adequately connected to her conduct. This, then, is the
challenge that Desideratum 2 insists that our account of the connection
requirement for knowledge should meet.
The same challenge arises, of course, in formulating the connection
requirement for recklessness. After all, just as it is possible to have
latent knowledge, so too is it possible to possess a very real, but not-
fully-conscious awareness of the risks that one's conduct imposes on
others. For example, the construction foreman might be aware of the
risks associated with various methods of blasting in an urban setting
(some methods being safer than others) even while not needing to
consciously attend to these different risks.
Accordingly, we can construct cases of recklessness that re directly
analogous to that of Frank. Just as Frank's knowledge of the fraud was
suppressed in a way that made it not sufficiently connected to his
conduct, so too can there be cases where the defendant possesses a
genuine awareness of a risk of harm, but this awareness is suppressed in
a way that prevents the connection requirement from being satisfied. For
example, perhaps I am well aware of the dangers that a dish I plan to
make for dinner will pose for one of my guests with a nut allergy, but
because of a racist slur a stranger hurled at me in the grocery store, I am
upset and distracted in a way that prevents my awareness of this risk
from being triggered. As a result, I don't act to avoid that risk, as I
normally would have. Accordingly, the analogous challenge in
formulating the connection requirement for recklessness is to separate (i)
those cases of latent (or non-conscious) risk-awareness where the
connection requirement is not satisfied from (ii) cases of this type where
it is satisfied. This is the challenge that Desideratum 2 demands a
solution to for the mens rea of recklessness.
(Although I cannot fully address the issue here, note that
Desideratum 2 seems especially important because cases that are
structurally similar to latent knowledge can also arise for corporations,
not just individuals.78)
78. Suppose a corporation is charged with knowingly having made false
statements to a branch of the US government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
An employee of the corporation, Alice, submits a report containing factual
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III. SIMONS' COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION
REQUIREMENT FOR KNOWLEDGE AND RECKLESSNESS
With these two desiderata in view, let us consider Simons' attempt
to formulate the connection requirement for knowledge and
recklessness.79 As we will see, the counterfactual approach he offers is a
natural proposal, and seems to get many cases right. Nonetheless, this
Article contends that it fails precisely because of its counterfactual
nature. While I think it would remain useful as a heuristic that might
profitably be used by courts or juries (with proper guidance), the
drawbacks of the counterfactual approach shown below suggest that a
different kind of approach is needed in order to properly understand the
workings of the connection requirement. This Part focuses mainly on
errors to some government agency, but she does not know the relevant
statements are false. Now consider a different employee, Betty, who has no
regular dealings with Alice or her work. Betty happens to pick up a draft of the
report left lying in the copy machine. Being knowledgeable about certain
aspects of the report's contents, Betty realizes that it contains misstatements.
However, she does not know the significance of the report or even that it will be
submitted to the government. Accordingly, there is nothing to make Betty
suspect she should mention the issues she spotted in the report to any of her
colleagues. Still, under respondeat superior principles, knowledge possessed by
a corporation's employees in the scope of their employment will be imputed to
the corporation. See In re Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that "[a]n agent's knowledge is imputed to the corporation where
the agent is acting within the scope of his authority and where the knowledge
relates to matters within the scope of that authority"). Accordingly, if Betty's
knowledge of the false statements could be proved, it would plausibly be
attributed to the corporation. Speaking metaphorically, the corporation thus
might be said to possess "latent knowledge" of the false statements in the report.
Nonetheless, the connection requirement arguably is not satisfied in this case.
After all, Betty's knowledge seems not to be active in producing the conduct
that underlies the criminal charges against the corporation-i.e. writing and
submitting the report. Thus, there is reason to doubt that criminal liability is
appropriately imposed on the corporation in this case. Cf Kinsey v. Cendant
Corp., No. 04 Civ.0582 (RWS), 2004 WL 2591946, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16,
2004) ("It is not enough to establish fraud on the part of a corporation that one
corporate officer makes a false statement that another officer knows to be
false.").
One might object that criminal liability seems inappropriate here only because
respondeat superior principles would not attribute Betty's knowledge to the
corporation. Perhaps her knowledge is not within the scope of her employment.
I doubt this, but even if it were so, we would still want to know which normative
principles explain this aspect of respondeat superior doctrine, and the failure of
the connection requirement to be satisfied offers one plausible explanation.
79. See Simons, supra note 9.
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Simons' account of the connection requirement for knowledge. His
account can be straightforwardly carried over to recklessness, as can the
objections I raise. So to avoid duplication, I concentrate mainly on the
case of knowledge.
A. Simons'Account
Simons begins by suggesting and quickly rejecting a natural first-
pass proposal. He notes that perhaps the difficulties concerning latent
knowledge might be solved by what he calls a "counterfactual
consideration criterion":
if the actor had given the matter a moment's thought, would she have
been aware of the relevant risk? And would she then have
characterized the risk as likely [as required for knowledge], or as
significant [as required for recklessness]? If so, then perhaps the actor
should be deemed aware of a likely or significant risk of harm, even
if she was not consciously attending to such risks at the time of
action.
80
However, the trouble with this "counterfactual consideration
criterion" is that because it more or less tracks the definition of latent
knowledge, it would make virtually all cases of latent knowledge, or
knowledge from which one was distracted or that one had temporarily
forgotten, satisfy the connection requirement . It would, for example,
deem the connection requirement to be satisfied in the case of Frank.
After all, it is true of Frank at the time he approves the transfer of funds
to Bernie that, if Frank were to give the matter a moment's thought, he
would have been able to call to consciousness his knowledge that Bernie
was engaged in a fraud. As Simons explains, the present criterion fails
because it does not distinguish legitimate from illegitimate explanations
for why one did not sufficiently attend to the relevant inculpatory fact (or
risk). 2 Frank's failure to attend to and respond appropriately to his
knowledge of Bernie's fraud is understandable and excusable under the
circumstances. But this is something to which the present criterion is not
sensitive.
Accordingly, Simons suggests a more plausible proposal, which he
dubs the "counterfactual risk-avoidance criterion" (or "CRAC," for
short).83 Under this criterion, "the relevant inquiry is not whether the
actor would have been consciously aware of the risk if [s]he had
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considered the question, but whether, if the actor had brought the
knowledge to consciousness, she would have avoided the risk, or instead
would have acted the same way. 84 The test that this passage suggests is
the following:
CRACK: Let D be a defendant who performs the actus reus, A, of a
crime, C, that requires knowledge that p, but D has only latent (or
otherwise not fully conscious) knowledge that p at the relevant time.
(1) If D would have done A even if he had brought this latent
knowledge to consciousness, then the connection requirement is
satisfied.
(2) But if D would not have done A were his latent knowledge
brought to consciousness, then the connection requirement is not
satisfied.
Thus, this test asks how the defendant would have behaved were
she to have consciously considered the relevant piece of knowledge at
the time of acting. It is easy to see how CRACK can be extended to
recklessness.
85
One benefit of CRACK is that, unlike the counterfactual
consideration criterion, it suggests a way to distinguish (i) the cases of
latent knowledge, distraction and forgetting in which the connection
requirement is satisfied from (ii) the cases of these kinds in which it is
not. Specifically, if the person with latent knowledge would have acted
the same way with fully conscious knowledge, then we may take the
connection requirement to be satisfied; otherwise, not. Moreover,
CRACK seems to get the case of Frank right. After all, it was stipulated
that if Frank had not been distracted, but had been in a position to attend
to his knowledge of Bernie's fraud, he would not have done the act that
aided Bemie's fraud. Accordingly, CRACK correctly takes the
connection requirement to be unsatisfied in the case of Frank. Thus,
CRACK might seem to do an adequate job of satisfying Desideratum 2.86
84. See Simons, supra note 9, at 253.
85. Here is the test as applied to recklessness:
CRACR: Let D be a defendant who performs the actus reus, A, of a
recklessness crime that requires awareness of a substantial and unjustified risk
that p, but D has only a latent awareness of such a risk that p.
(1) If D would have done A had he brought his awareness of the risk that p
to consciousness, then the connection requirement is satisfied, and D may
be punished accordingly.
(2) But if D would not have done A were the latent awareness of the risk
that p brought to consciousness, then the connection requirement is not
satisfied.
86. Likewise for the corporate case, discussed supra note 78. Insofar as Alice
would not have submitted the report to the government if made aware of Betty's
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B. An Initial Problem
However, an obvious problem CRACK encounters right away is that
it seems not to satisfy Desideratum 1. That is, it offers little explanation
of what it might mean for knowledge of some fact to be active in
producing a particular bit of knowing misconduct. To see this, suppose
the proposed test is satisfied: D possesses latent knowledge of the
requisite fact, p, at the time he does A, and, moreover, D would have
acted the same way even if fully conscious of this knowledge.
Nonetheless, this does not guarantee that D's latent knowledge that p was
actually involved in producing (or actuating) D's conduct.
Consider a variation of the case of Frank-Bad Frank. Like Frank,
Bad Frank is distracted from his knowledge of Bernie's fraud upon
receiving news that his family has been in a bad car accident. The only
difference is that in this case, Bad Frank would have gone on to approve
the transfer of his clients' funds to Bernie even if he consciously attended
to his knowledge of the fraud. Thus, Bad Frank's knowledge in the
present case seems to be no more active in producing his conduct than
this knowledge was in the original version of the case, where the
connection requirement was not satisfied. Accordingly, like Frank, Bad
Frank's knowledge does not seem to be appropriately connected to his
conduct. The causal contribution Bad Frank's knowledge would have
made to his actions was blocked by the overwhelmingly distracting news
of his family's car accident. Thus, satisfying the counterfactual test
offered by CRACK does not guarantee that an actor's knowledge was
appropriately connected to his conduct.
The fact that CRACK does not capture what it means for knowledge
to be active in producing a particular bit of conduct is a significant
drawback. It amounts to abandoning the attempt to satisfy Desideratum
1.
However, perhaps the ambitions of Simons' account are different.
In particular, CRACK might be construed as an attempt to offer a test for
when a particular actor with latent knowledge is just as culpable as
someone who acts analogously with fully conscious knowledge, in which
case the person with merely latent knowledge could plausibly be
punished as an actor who uncontroversially acts knowingly.87 Thus
knowledge of the false statements it contained, Betty's knowledge would not be
appropriately connected to the act of submitting the report under Simons' test.
87. This would make latent knowledge function in the same way as willful
ignorance. The "traditional rationale" for allowing willful ignorance to be
treated as a substitute for actual knowledge is that acting in willful ignorance is
supposed to be just as culpable as acting knowingly. See Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011); United States v.
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interpreted, the suggestion is that we can make do in the criminal law
without an account that satisfies Desideratum 1-i.e. without an answer
to the theoretical question of what is involved in a piece of knowledge
actuating a piece of conduct. Fully stated, then, CRACK as a culpability
test ("CRACK CT") amounts to this:
CRACK CT: Let D be a defendant who performs the actus reus, A,
of a crime, C, that requires knowledge that p, but D has only latent
(or otherwise not fully conscious) knowledge that p.
(1) If D would have done A even if he had brought this latent
knowledge to consciousness, then D is just as culpable as
someone who does A with fully conscious knowledge that p
(i.e. as in a paradigmatic case of doing C knowingly). Hence, D
can be punished accordingly.
(2) But if D would not have done A were his latent knowledge
brought to consciousness, then D is not as culpable as someone
who does C with fully conscious knowledge that p.
At best, this account attempts to satisfy Desideratum 2, while
suggesting that we can make do without an answer to the challenge in
Desideratum 1. (As before, it's easy to see how this test can be carried
over to recklessness.88)
C. The Problem with CRACK as a Culpability Test
CRACK CT is also deeply problematic. Most importantly, it
permits treating defendants who in fact did not consciously attend to
their knowledge as if they had done so. That is, CRACK CT allows us to
take the former group of defendants to be just as culpable as the latter
group, solely on the basis of how the former would have behaved under
non-actual circumstances. Thus, it ties the amount of culpability
attributed to these defendants not to the type of mental state they actually
acted with (i.e. latent or otherwise not fully conscious knowledge), but
rather to how they would have behaved if they had possessed a somewhat
different mental state while acting (i.e. fully conscious knowledge). In
effect, then, CRACK CT holds agents responsible for how they are
willing to act, not on the basis of the nature of their actual mental states
and conduct.
But this is not the usual way of the criminal law. The criminal law
requires culpability attributions, and the resulting imposition of
Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). See also, Sarch supra note
56, at 5.
88. Cf supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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punishment, to be tied to the nature of one's actual conduct and mental
states-not how one would have behaved under non-actual
circumstances.89 After all, were it to do otherwise, the criminal law
would be attributing culpability and imposing corresponding
punishments merely on the basis of bad character.90 As Simons himself
explains:
one very important rationale for requiring an appropriate connection
between mental states and acts is to avoid punishing individuals
simply because they display a "bad character." On this view, the
harsh sanctions of the criminal law should not be brought to bear on
individuals who have not yet done anything wrong, but who merely
have disreputable-or even dangerous-character traits..... .We
are similarly, and properly, reluctant to impose punishment on a
person simply for [attitudes or characteristics] unless and until
[they] are expressed in action.
9 1
For ease of reference, call the principle Simons expresses in the last
sentence of this passage the "punishment for actual attitudes principle,"
or "PAAP" for short. It clearly runs afoul of this principle to punish a
person who does actus reus A with merely latent knowledge as if she did
A with fully conscious knowledge, since it is only the former mental
state, not the latter, that can be productive of or expressed in her actual
conduct.
To this, one might object that if prong (1) of CRACK CT is
satisfied, then we can safely make an exception to PAAP. After all, if
we are quite sure that someone who does A with merely latent (or
otherwise not fully conscious) knowledge would act the same way were
she to consciously attend to that knowledge, then it might seem we can
be confident that she is just as culpable as someone who does A with
fully conscious knowledge. Consider the argument behind this objection
in more detail. To give it a name (an admittedly tendentious one), call it
the seductive argument. In general, performing the actus reus, A, with
knowledge of the inculpatory proposition, p, is culpable because it shows
one to be insufficiently concerned with avoiding the harm caused by A or
89. Cf. Simons, supra note 9, at 233-34.
90. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 489 (1948) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) ("Our whole tradition is that a man can be punished by criminal
sanctions only for specific acts defined beforehand to be criminal, not for
general misconduct or bearing a reputation for such misconduct."); WAYNE
LAFAVE, 1 SUBTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1 (2d ed. 2014) ("One basic
premise of Anglo-American criminal law is that no crime can be committed by
bad thoughts alone.").
91. Simons, supra note 9, at 233-34 (emphasis added).
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the other bad-making features of A. Since p is the inculpatory
proposition for the crime of which A is the actus reus, knowing that p
should give one a motivating reason not to perform A-it should
motivationally repel one from A. But if one proceeds to do A anyway
(and lacks any adequate excuse or justification for doing so), then this
shows one to be insufficiently concerned with the reasons against
performing A (i.e. insufficiently repelled by A's bad-making features).
As Simons correctly notes, "[i]f a person acts despite his belief that he is
likely to cause harm ... (or. .. despite his belief that an inculpatory
circumstance is likely... ), then his culpability arises from his failure to
give sufficient weight to that consideration in his conduct."92 Now
consider how things stand when prong (1) of CRACK CT is satisfied. If
there is sufficient evidence that the defendant with merely latent
knowledge would behave the same way even with fully conscious
knowledge, then, the present argument goes, this tells us something
about her degree of insufficient concern for those who will be adversely
affected by her conduct. On the basis of this evidence, we might
conclude that she has just as much insufficient concern for the protected
interests of others as a similarly situated defendant with fully conscious
knowledge. Accordingly, the seductive argument supposes, she is just as
culpable as a similarly situated defendant with fully conscious
knowledge. As a result, it might seem there is nothing problematic about
departing from PAAP in such a case, and holding the defendant to
account not for her actual mental state of latent knowledge, but for the
mental state we know she would be willing to act with.
However, the seductive argument fails. It conflates the culpability
of one's character (i.e. one's general level of concern for the protected
interests of others) with one's culpability for a particular action (i.e. the
extent to which that action manifests insufficient regard for others). To
see the importance of this distinction, recall Bill, who we know intended
to kill his uncle, but, in fact caused his uncle's death only negligently.
93
Because we know that Bill intended to kill his uncle, and indeed are quite
sure that he would have killed him intentionally had he gotten the
chance, it follows that we know Bill has a highly deplorable character.
Nonetheless, this does not provide the basis for taking Bill's conduct to
be as culpable as intentional murder, and for punishing him accordingly.
The seductive argument, however, collapses this distinction and would
take Bill to be punishable as an intentional murderer because of what we
know about the badness of his character-i.e. because of what we know
he would do. The seductive argument goes wrong because it would have
92. Id. at 249-50.
93. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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us punish a person who does A with some mental state M1 (e.g.
recklessness, merely latent knowledge, etc.) as if he did A while
possessing a more culpable mental state M2 (e.g. fully conscious
knowledge, intent, etc.)-which amounts to making an exception to
PAAP-simply because we are confident that this person would have
done A with M2, too. Such a position implausibly entails that Bill could
be punished for intentional murder.
The reason Bill's actual conduct does not support a conviction for
intentional murder, although we know he intended to commit murder and
has a character as deplorable as that of a murderer, is that Bill's actually
only negligent conduct did not manifest the amount of insufficient
regard-and thus culpability-that characterizes intentional murder.
94
But what is it for an action to manifest a given amount of insufficient
regard? Let me clarify this crucial concept of manifestation. Grant that
what matters to criminal punishment is not the badness of one's character
directly, but rather culpability for one's actual conduct. Moreover, grant
that one's culpability for a particular action corresponds to the amount of
insufficient regard for the protected interests of others that that action
manifests. The question remains: how do we determine how much
insufficient regard a given action manifests?
The proposal I am sympathetic to draws on a view recently
suggested by Gideon Yaffe.95 The basic idea is to apply a principle of
lenity when determining how much insufficient regard a particular action
manifests, and thus how culpable one is for it.96 Suppose that for any
bad or wrong action, A, we can identify the minimum amount of
94. The criminal law thus seems to embody the following principle: The
amount of culpability the criminal law may treat a defendant as having (and use
as the basis for fixing the amount of punishment he deserves) equals the amount
of culpability manifested in the conduct he actually performed and for which he
was convicted (where culpability is presently being understood as insufficient
regard for the protected interest of others).
95. See Gideon Yaffe, The Point of Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance 22
(July 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Thomas
Aquinas also endorsed a principle of this sort: "unless we have evident
indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by
interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him." THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. 2, Q.60 art. 4, at 151 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., R. & T. Washbourne, Ltd. 1918) (1274). Aquinas's
argument for this principle is that "from the very fact that a man thinks ill of
another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him," and "no man
ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause." id.
Accordingly, he concludes, we ought o apply a principle of lenity when
attributing blame to actors for their conduct.
96. Cf Yaffe, supra note 95, at 22 (discussing a related principle of lenity).
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insufficient regard for the protected interests of others (i.e. ill will) that
would be needed to perform A in the actual circumstances of A's
performance. The relevant principle of lenity, then, dictates that we may
take A to manifest only this minimum required amount of insufficient
regard for others, and no more.97 Accordingly, even if we know that Bill
has an utterly deplorable character, and his ill will towards his uncle is
bottomless, if we would only need to posit the amount of insufficient
regard that is normally associated with a merely negligent actor in order
to explain Bill's actual conduct under the circumstances, then it is only
this minimum amount of insufficient regard that we'd be permitted-by
the principle of lenity-to take his actual conduct to manifest.
98
97. One might wonder what motivates this principle of lenity. While I can't
offer a full justification of it here, let me suggest a few possible ways to explain
its appeal. First, one might think that this principle of lenity is an appropriate
expression of generosity on the part of the moral community (i.e. the state) or its
members. Insofar as generosity or charity is a virtue that states and individuals
should display-especially in morally charged activities like attributing
culpability to others-then this would provide some normative support for the
principle of lenity suggested in the text.
Second, perhaps this principle of lenity can be justified on more cynical,
pragmatic grounds. One might think that a wise ruler-on the model of
Machiavelli's prince-would do well to only punish his subjects to the extent
that he absolutely must in order to remain credible. Thus, the wise ruler would
not punish his subjects more harshly than is demanded by the minimum amount
of culpability required to explain their actions. Insofar as our blaming practices
generally have come to embody this wisdom as well, this would explain why we
are inclined to see a given piece of conduct only as manifesting the minimum
amount of ill will towards others that is necessary to posit in order to explain the
performance of that action under the circumstances. This, then, is a second
route to the principle of lenity described in the text.
98. Simons, too, recognizes something like this principle of lenity. But,
problematically, he cashes it out in terms of what we normally can infer from
the defendant's conduct and mental state. He writes:
But why is the reckless actor less culpable than the knowing actor? One
explanation is this: we ordinarily cannot be confident that the reckless actor
would have created the risk of a deadly harm, or taken the risk of transporting
the package, if she knew that the harm was likely to occur or that the package
was likely to contain cocaine. (...) [I]t cannot be assumed that the inadvertent
actor would have acted as the advertent (reckless) one did, or that the reckless
actor would have acted as the knowing one did. Normally, it is more accurate
to assume the contrary, that he would not have so acted.
Simons, supra note 9, at 254-55. This is problematic because in some cases we
know that what we normally can assume or infer about the defendant's
culpability just does not hold. This is clearly illustrated by, for example, the
case of Bill. There we know that Bill would have intentionally killed his uncle
if given the chance. So Simons' proposal, too, seems to implausibly entail that
Bill can be punished as an intentional murderer.
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Now apply this framework to CRACK CT's proposed solution to the
problem of latent knowledge. If we know that the actor with merely
latent (or not-fully conscious) knowledge would have performed the
actus reus anyway even if he had consciously attended to this knowledge,
this at best allows us to conclude that this actor's character is as bad as
someone who performs the actus reus with fully conscious knowledge.
But it does not automatically follow that his actual conduct, which
involved less-than-fully conscious knowledge, manifests as much
insufficient regard-and thus culpability-as the same actus reus done
with fully conscious knowledge would. After all, the amount of
insufficient regard manifested by an act performed with not fully
conscious knowledge equals the minimum amount of insufficient regard
needed, under the circumstances, to generate that particular conduct.
And this will vary heavily depending on the circumstances of the case.
In particular, it will depend on things like: (i) the explanation of why the
defendant did not consciously attend to the relevant piece of knowledge,
(ii) whether it would be reasonable to expect someone like the defendant
to consciously attend to it in a case like this, (iii) whether a normal
person would be able to give due weight to the relevant knowledge even
without bringing it to consciousness, and so on. For example, it might
not be reasonable to expect someone in Frank's situation to recall his
knowledge of the fraud and be able to respond to it properly under the
extreme circumstances of that case. Accordingly, we would not need to
posit very much insufficient regard for the interests of others in order to
explain Frank's approval of the transfer here.
99
The upshot is that while CRACK CT-particularly prong (I)-
plausibly identifies conditions under which the defendant with merely
latent knowledge has a character that is just as bad as a similarly situated
actor with fully conscious knowledge, prong (1) does not tell us when the
defendant's actual conduct manifests as much insufficient regard as the
same conduct performed with fully conscious knowledge. For this
reason, the case of Bad Frank threatens to make trouble for the present
account. Bad Frank was stipulated to be such that, even if he were to
bring his knowledge of Bernie's fraud to consciousness, he still would
99. This explains why the criminal law rejects the idea of holding people
accountable on the basis merely of how they would have behaved under
counterfactual circumstances. It requires that the culpability attributed to the
defendant, and thus the punishment he is given, be tied to the mental states he
actually had when acting. This, in turn, is because criminal punishment is
premised on the amount of culpability manifested in one's actual conduct, not
on the culpability of one's character (which is all that, facts about what one
would do under other counterfactual circumstances directly speaks to).
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have gone ahead and approved the transfer of funds to Bernie. While
this plausibly shows that Bad Frank's character is just as contemptible as
someone who knowingly aids a massive fraud, it is far from obvious that
Bad Frank is just as culpable for his conduct as the analogous action
performed in full conscious awareness of the fraud. Given that Bad
Frank in fact was understandably distracted from his culpable knowledge
at the time of acting, it is doubtful that this knowledge was active in
producing his actual conduct. Thus, it is doubtful that his actual conduct
manifested more culpability than the same act done only negligently
would have. While we know Bad Frank was willing to go so far as to
knowingly aid Bernie's fraud, in fact he did not go this far. His
knowledge of Bernie's fraud was understandably blocked or screened off
from playing the role in his deliberations and actions that it normally
would have. (This is admittedly a piece of moral luck, occasioned by his
being reasonably distracted from his knowledge of Bernie's fraud.)
Accordingly, CRACK CT is in trouble because it entails that Bad Frank's
actual conduct is just as culpable as knowingly aiding a massive fraud,
even though his conduct, given the distracted state he was in, does not
actually manifest his level of insufficient regard for others.
D. A Weaker Proposal
Simons seems to recognize that there is something problematic
about the present account: He acknowledges that it is "much more
controversial" to go along with prong (1) of CRACK CT and impose a
heightened punishment on the defendant in virtue of a mental state he did
not actually act with, but would have been willing to act with.100
Accordingly, Simons raises the idea of backing off of prong (1), and
instead insisting only on prong (2).101 Instead of claiming that the
defendant's willingness to perform the actus reus even with fully
conscious knowledge is sufficient for the level of culpability that the
defendant would have if the connection requirement were satisfied, we
should in fact only take this willingness on the defendant's part to be a
necessary condition for having this level of culpability. Thus, prong (2)
would just identify one circumstance under which we can treat the
connection requirement as not being satisfied. Specifically, if we are
confident that the defendant would not have done the actus reus, A, were
his latent knowledge brought to consciousness, then we cannot treat him
as precisely as culpable as someone who does A while fully conscious of
the relevant knowledge.
100. See Simons, supra note 9, at 255.
101. Id.
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However, this weaker position is also problematic. For one thing,
counterexamples loom. Some defendants with latent knowledge
intuitively can be just as culpable as similarly situated actors with fully
conscious knowledge, even though these defendants would not perform
the relevant act with fully conscious knowledge. Consider yet another
variation of the case of Frank. This variation involves Phil, who is
almost exactly like Frank: He, too, came to know of Bernie's fraud the
same morning. But whereas Frank was distracted from this knowledge
by hearing of his family's accident, Phil is distracted from his knowledge
of Bernie's fraud because he is given to ogling an attractive coworker
across the hall. Because of his distracted state, Phil has only latent
knowledge of Bernie's fraud, and in his distraction, he authorizes a
transfer of funds to Bernie. Nonetheless, suppose that if Phil's
knowledge had been fully conscious, he would not have transferred the
funds to Bernie. I submit that, under these circumstances, Phil is just as
culpable for authorizing the transfer with latent knowledge of the fraud
as it would have been to do the same act with fully conscious knowledge.
Thus, prong (2) seems to face problems because some reasons for one's
knowledge being only latent do not seem to reduce one's culpability for
how one acts while in this mental state.
One might object that Phil seems just as culpable as a similarly
situated actor with fully conscious knowledge only because the
independent culpability of ogling a coworker is added to the culpability
of aiding a fraud negligently, but combining distinct sources of
culpability in this way is illicit. However, the above case does not
involve adding together separate quantities of culpability. Instead, the
counterexample is meant to appeal only to the culpability inherent in
Phil's act of approving the transfer with latent knowledge of the fraud,
where one salient feature of this act is that Phil did it only because he
was distracted by ogling his co-worker. Phil's behavior suggests that he
is more concerned with getting the pleasure of staring at someone's body
than with the victims of the fraud he is latently aware of. Even if Phil
would not normally approve the transfer, his action demonstrates that, at
least on this occasion, he values his own sexual gratification more highly
than the interests of the victims of the fraud. Had he been sufficiently
concerned with those interests, he would have approached his work with
greater care and not allowed a trivial distraction to interfere with the need
to avoid transfers to fraudulent investment managers. Accordingly, the
above case appeals only to the insufficient regard manifested in Phil's
action and does not require cobbling together quantities of culpability
from different sources.
If this is right, the case of Phil suggests that a defendant's
willingness to perform the actus reus even with fully conscious
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knowledge is not necessary for him to be as culpable as a similarly
situated actor with fully conscious knowledge. Accordingly, prong (2)
appears dubious. (Other cases seem to support the same conclusion.102)
In addition to this difficulty, it is important to recall the costs for the
present account in giving up on any attempt to satisfy Desideratum 1.
Since CRACK CT initially set forth both necessary and sufficient
conditions for the actor with latent knowledge to be precisely as culpable
as the comparable actor with fully conscious knowledge, it amounted to a
test for equal culpability that would allow us to make do without any
explanation of what is involved in a piece of knowledge actuating one's
conduct. But once the account is weakened to include only the necessary
condition-i.e. only prong (2) of CRACK CT-we no longer have a test
for equal culpability. Even if the necessary condition is satisfied, the
question of whether the defendant with latent knowledge can be punished
as a full-fledged knowing criminal remains open. Thus, prong (2) by
itself does not amount to a workable approach to the issues surrounding
latent knowledge and the connection requirement in general. It leaves
important questions about the nature of knowing misconduct unanswered
and fails to explain how acting from latent knowledge works or why it is
culpable.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to ask whether we can do better. It
would clearly be more satisfying for our account to both explain what it
means for knowledge to be active in producing conduct-i.e. satisfy
Desideratum 1-as well as explain how latent knowledge can produce
102. It seems there can be defendants who are just as culpable as analogous
actors with fully conscious knowledge even though these defendants can only
bring themselves to perform the actus reus with latent knowledge, and would not
perform it if the relevant knowledge were made fully conscious. Consider
someone who possesses latent knowledge of an inculpatory proposition, but if
he were to bring this knowledge to consciousness-were it vividly present in his
mind-he would not be able to go through with the actus reus he is planning.
Sensing this about himself, he avoids thinking about the inculpatory proposition
he latently knows to be true. Perhaps he plays loud Wagner music on his iPod
to push all unpleasant thoughts from his mind. By doing so, he enables himself
to go through with the contemplated conduct. Such a person plausibly would be
just as culpable as someone who acts the same way with fully conscious
knowledge of the inculpatory proposition, and this is so even though he would
not do the actus reus if his latent knowledge were fully brought to
consciousness. His conduct seems to manifest at least as much insufficient
regard as that of the full-fledged knowing actor. This, in turn, is because he
adopted a strategy of self-management to enable him to get around his
limitations-i.e. his inability to go through with the crime if his latent
knowledge were brought to consciousness. Thus, we seem to have a different
sort of counter-example to prong (2).
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and affect the culpability of one's conduct-i.e. satisfy Desideratum 2.
The account of the connection requirement I will offer in the next Part
aims to do just this. As a result, it remedies the defects of CRACK CT.
IV. A NON-COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION
REQUIREMENT FOR KNOWLEDGE AND RECKLESSNESS
A. Presenting the Account
The problems with Simons' proposal largely stem from its use of a
counterfactual test. By contrast, the account defended in this Part places
normative questions, not a counterfactual inquiry, at the heart of the
procedure for determining whether the connection requirement is
satisfied. To work up to the account, I consider in detail a paradigmatic
case in which the connection requirement for knowledge is satisfied.
The case involves fully conscious knowledge, rather than latent
knowledge, distraction or the like. Once we understand how the
connection requirement works in the paradigmatic case, we can apply the
resulting approach to cases involving less-than-fully-conscious
knowledge.
Here, then, is a paradigmatic case in which the actor's knowledge is
appropriately connected to his conduct to make him guilty of a
knowledge crime. In some jurisdictions, if one lights a building on fire
knowing that another person is inside, this suffices for being guilty of a
higher grade of arson.103 Thus, consider David, who lights a building on
fire while fully aware of the fact that another person is currently inside.
He sees the person inside the building with his own eyes, and even thinks
to himself, "What do you know, there's someone in there." To make this
a case of a pure knowledge crime, suppose that David does not desire or
intend the death of the person in the building. David's purpose in setting
the fire is just to collect the insurance on the building. Thus, David is
merely insufficiently concerned with the well-being of the person inside
the building. In such a case, it should be uncontroversial that the
connection requirement is satisfied. Hence, David is guilty of the higher
grade of arson.
As I'll now go on to explain, such a paradigm case of knowing
misconduct involves three main features. First, David performs the actus
103. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.15 ("A person is guilty of arson in the
second degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by
starting a fire, and when (a) another person who is not a participant in the crime
is present in such building or motor vehicle at the time, and (b) the defendant
knows that fact or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a
person therein a reasonable possibility.") (emphasis added).
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reus of the crime (i.e. lighting the building on fire) for some motivating
reason or other (perhaps several). As before, °4 let us suppose that this
reason, RI, consists of the set of desires and instrumental beliefs that
together rationalize this action, and which (non-deviantly) causes this
action in virtue of rationalizing it.105
Now recall the puzzle behind Desideratum 1.106 It might appear
odd that the knowledge at issue in this case-i.e. that someone is inside
the building-does not figure into the reason for which David lit the
fire-i.e. R1. How, then, can this piece of knowledge be active in
producing this action, or connected to it in a way that allows this
knowledge to be part of what determines the amount of culpability the
action manifests? How can a particular belief (one's practical certainty
of a fact or awareness of a substantial risk) be active in producing a
particular action even if it does not directly figure into the reason for
which the action was performed?
The second feature of the paradigm case provides the answer. In
this case, it is fair to expect that David's knowledge of the person's
presence in the building should trigger a motivating reason, R2, against
lighting the building on fire that has a strength sufficient to outweigh RI
(plus whatever other motivating reasons he might have for the action),
but it does not. In other words, if we were dealing with a normal law-
abiding person, the knowledge of a person's presence within the building
would combine with another desire held by the actor to avoid causing
unjustifiable harm to others, and this would give the actor a sufficient
motivating reason not to light the building on fire. This is reason R2.
Because David actually proceeds to light the building on fire, we know
that he either lacked R2 altogether or that R2 did not have a sufficient
strength to outweigh R1.
Accordingly, David's knowledge that a person was in the building
is appropriately included as part of the causal explanation of his act of
lighting the fire. In particular, it is an instance of causation by the lack of
contrary reasons. Here I am following Arpaly and Schroeder.'0 7 In
particular, I am basing my account on their discussion of how the lack of
104. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
105. See Arpaly and Schroeder, supra note 42. In their view, "[t]o think or act
for a reason is for the event of one's thinking or acting to be caused (or
appropriately causally explained) by one's other attitudes in virtue of the fact
that these attitudes [i.e. their contents] rationalize (to some extent) the thought or
action." (emphasis omitted). Id. at 62.
106. See supra Part I.
107. See Arpaly and Schroeder, supra note 42, at 82-83.
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rationalizing reasons can be causally efficacious in producing an action.
Here is their very insightful explanation of the phenomenon:
For an action to be caused by, or appropriately explained by, a set of
attitudes it is not necessary that these attitudes contribute a causal
"oomph" to the action. There is a role in (some) accounts of
causation, and in (some) accounts of scientifically acceptable
explanation, for events that occur in part because other events do not
occur ..... There seem to be a wide range of cases in which causal
explanation by appeal to absences is correct or appropriate. And
some of these cases are found in the mental realm. If there had been
a fire truck parked in the intersection on Travis's left he would not
have turned left. The absence of a strong rationalization not to turn
left plays a causal role in the bringing about of Travis's left turn. The
absence of a strong rationalization is not itself providing 'oomph' to
the process, is not doing work in the technical sense proper to
physics, but it is part of the causal or explanatory picture
nonetheless. 0
Now apply this idea to David. Given his knowledge, David
reasonably should have had motivating reason R2 and it should have
outweighed Rl, but it did not. Accordingly, his lack of R2 under
circumstances where we can legitimately expect him to possess it is a
salient part of-something worth mentioning in-the causal explanation
of his act of lighting the building on fire. 10 9 This, then, indicates how to
understand LaFave's talk of a mens rea "actuating" a piece of conduct
when this mens rea is knowledge.110 A piece of knowledge is involved in
"actuating" a bit of conduct if the knowledge could have been expected
to trigger this countervailing reason R2 with sufficient strength, but in
fact it did not.1  Accordingly, we have an explanation of how
108. Id.
109. My account thus commits me to saying that what information is
appropriately included in the causal explanation of an action can depend on
normative considerations and considerations about what information strikes us
as salient or worth mentioning.
110. See supra note 13.
111. This also makes sense of the similar claims Dressler makes about the
requirement of "motivational concurrence"-i.e. that "[t]he defendant's conduct
that caused the social harm must have been set into motion or impelled by the
thought process that constituted the mens rea of the offense." Dressler, supra
note 8, at 199 (emphasis added). Cf. supra note 46.
20151
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
knowledge might actuate or be active in producing action, thus satisfying
Desideratum 1.
112
The fact that David's knowledge is in this sense active in producing
his conduct also has implications about the culpability of this conduct.
In particular, the failure of David's knowledge to trigger a sufficiently
strong countervailing reason, R2, is a legitimate part of the basis for
determining how culpable David is for starting the fire (i.e. how much
insufficient regard for others it manifests). It is because David's
knowledge that there is a person in the building did not trigger a
motivating reason of a sufficient strength against starting the fire that his
conduct manifests a serious amount of insufficient regard for others.
More precisely, it manifests substantially more insufficient regard than it
would have were he unaware that someone was in the building.
There is one more wrinkle that the account must accommodate. In
particular, the knowledge that a person is in the building cannot always
be expected to give one a countervailing reason like R2 against lighting
the building on fire. For example, one might be in circumstances that
make it reasonable not o remember that there was a person in the
building, or one might have been distracted for understandable reasons,
or one might have been debilitatingly fatigued, or involuntarily drugged,
or in a state of shock, etc. Accordingly, in order for one's lack of R2 to
have been part of the causal explanation of what produced one's action
of lighting the building on fire, one had to have been in conditions that
normally can be expected, both statistically and normatively, to trigger
this countervailing reason R2 with sufficient strength. If one is
reasonably distracted, understandably forgetful, involuntarily intoxicated,
in a state of shock, or the like, then one's failure to possess R2 with
sufficient strength would not appear to be a salient part of the causal
explanation of one's act of lighting the building on fire. As a result, the
connection requirement would not be satisfied and one would not count
112. One might worry that this feature of my account simply makes it covertly
rely on counterfactual considerations, thus rendering it illicit in just the way I
argued Simons' account was problematically counterfactual. Nonetheless, my
account is not counterfactual in a problematic way. The reason is that according
to my account, we are not asked to evaluate one's culpability based on how one
would have acted under non-actual circumstances (i.e. if one had had a different
mental state). Rather, my test asks us to evaluate one's culpability based on
one's actual mental state and attitudes-in particular, one's lack of certain
motivating reasons against the misconduct in question, which one should have
had, but did not. That is why I reject the claim that my account is counterfactual
in any illicit way. It assigns culpability based on one's actual configuration of
mental states.
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as guilty of a knowledge crime (i.e. would not be as culpable as a truly
knowing wrongdoer).
Of course, no excusing conditions of this sort exist in David's case,
since he is a paradigmatic instance of someone who does act knowingly.
Thus, the third core feature of the paradigmatic case is the lack of any
circumstances that might excuse the failure of the actor's knowledge to
trigger a countervailing motivating reason, R2, with sufficient strength.
Consequently, the important take-away is that our account of the
connection requirement must accommodate the possibility of such
excusing conditions.
Obviously, there can be disagreement about what the circumstances
are in which knowledge that someone is in the building can be expected
to trigger a reason like R2 against lighting the building on fire. But at a
minimum, it would not be plausible, I think, for the law to take garden-
variety distraction or forgetfulness to be enough to prevent the
connection requirement from being satisfied. The reason is that normal
people are sufficiently aware and competent that merely being distracted
by an event that is not especially out of the ordinary typically will not be
enough to prevent the belief (even the latent belief) that a person is inside
the building from triggering the relevant countervailing reason against
lighting the building on fire. To adopt this rule would be to rely on
normative assumptions about when the belief that someone is in the
building can reasonably be expected to trigger a motivating reason like
R2 against lighting the building on fire.
Accordingly, we see how normative considerations can impact
whether a given piece of knowledge is adequately connected to the
relevant actus reus. If the knowledge can be expected (normatively,
based on our best statistical understanding of how normal people
function cognitively) to give a law-abiding person a decisive motivating
reason against performing the actus reus, but it actually did not give the
defendant this reason, then his knowledge and the absence of the
relevant countervailing reason against the actus reus are a salient part of
the causal explanation of the defendant's performance of that actus reus.
But if the relevant knowledge cannot be expected to produce this reason,
then the presence of his knowledge and the absence of the countervailing
reason against the actus reus would not be a salient part of the causal
explanation of that action. In that case, the connection requirement
would not be satisfied. In this way, the question of whether the
connection requirement is satisfied in any given case will be highly
dependent on what motivating reasons the relevant piece of knowledge
can be expected to trigger for a law-abiding person in the defendant's
circumstances.
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Having identified the three core features of the paradigmatic case in
which the connection requirement for knowledge is satisfied, we can
abstract from the particulars of David's case to get a general account of
the connection requirement. Thus, we get:
Connection Requirement for Knowledge: D's knowledge, K, that
inculpatory proposition p is true (where p is the proposition e.g. that
one's conduct will cause a bad result or that some attendant
circumstance obtains) is appropriately connected to (causally
efficacious in producing) D's performance of the actus reus, A, of a
crime requiring knowledge that p if and only if:
(1) D possesses K at least latently during the relevant part of his
performance of A,
(2) while A'ing (or the relevant part of it) D is in conditions
(cognitive, situational, etc.) where we would expect K to give a
law abiding person in D's situation a decisive (overriding)
motivating reason not to do A (i.e. to do something besides A
that would not impose the harm associated with p), and
(3) K did not actually give D a motivating reason against A of a
sufficient strength to get him to refrain from doing A (i.e. D did
A anyway).
When these three conditions are satisfied, we would be permitted to
say that defendant D did A "despite" his knowledge that p. In that case,
the connection requirement between knowledge and actus reus is
satisfied.
Moreover, when these three conditions obtain, the piece of
knowledge in question can fairly be treated as part of the basis for
determining how much culpability action A manifests. The thought here
is that K should give D a motivating reason not to do A because D
should have sufficient regard for the protected interests of others.
Because K does not trigger such a motivating reason of a sufficient
strength, despite D's being in conditions where we would expect it to, we
must suppose that D's regard for others is insufficient to a substantial
degree in order to explain his performance of A. Thus, his act A would
manifest a substantial amount of insufficient regard.
This account of the connection requirement for knowledge is useful,
not only because it captures the paradigm case of knowing misconduct,
but also because it entails several sufficient conditions for when the
connection requirement is not satisfied. These are sufficient conditions
for D's action, A, to not manifest as much insufficient regard as it would
if D's knowledge were appropriately connected to A. This, as we'll see,
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is what enables the account to accommodate cases of latent knowledge,
and thereby satisfy Desideratum 2.
The first of these sufficient conditions for the connection
requirement not being satisfied follows from prong (1). Specifically, the
connection requirement remains unsatisfied if:
(1*) D only acquired K after performing A.
This is hardly surprising. We saw the importance of this rule in Part
I. 1 13  More interestingly, in virtue of prong (2) the connection
requirement would also not be satisfied if:
(2*) D is not in conditions (cognitive, situational, etc.) where we
would expect K to trigger an overriding motivating reason not to do
A.
This sufficient condition might obtain, for example:
(i)because D is reasonably distracted or overwhelmed by the
circumstances,
(ii)because D acquired K so long ago that he reasonably forgot it
even if he would remember it if prompted (i.e. we cannot have
expected a law-abiding person to recognize and guide his behavior in
light of K), or
(iii) because, although D has sufficient regard for others (i.e. has a
sufficiently strong desire
for their good), D was in a state of shock that
prevented him from fully controlling his
conduct despite being conscious of his behavior
at the time.
It is (2*) that explains why the connection requirement sometimes is
not satisfied in cases of merely latent knowledge. Recall the case of
Frank. The explanation for why the connection requirement was not
satisfied there is that, given the emotional disturbance Frank experienced
upon hearing that his family had been in the car accident, Frank did not
seem to be in cognitive conditions where we would expect his
knowledge of Bernie's fraud to trigger a motivating reason against
authorizing the transfer to Bernie. It clearly provided him with a
normative reason not to authorize the transfer, but in light of his
disturbed emotional state, his knowledge cannot plausibly be expected to
trigger a motivating reason to this effect (i.e. to make this normative
reason a motivating reason of his). Accordingly, (2*) is satisfied, and
113. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
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prong (2) of the connection requirement is not. This explains the
intuition that Frank's knowledge was not sufficiently connected to his
conduct to take him to be guilty of knowingly aiding and abetting
Bernie's fraud.
Fortunately, for the present account, it does not entail that all cases
of latent or not fully conscious knowledge fail to satisfy the connection
requirement. Instead, the account clearly also allows that some non-
occurrent, non-conscious beliefs (ones you would be able to call to
consciousness on reflection or if prompted) can still be sufficiently
connected to your action to be the basis for holding you accountable for
it as a full-fledged knowing action. For example, recall the Jackson
court's dictum that "Jackson would be guilty of 'knowingly' failing to
appear if he decided early on that he would not attend his scheduled
court appearances, and he then dismissed the matter from his mind."
' 1 4
In such a case, Jackson's knowledge of his obligation to appear in court
would be latent. After all, we are supposing that he "dismissed it from
his mind." Nonetheless, in the court's example, there are no disturbing
factors that would prevent us from reasonably expecting Jackson's latent
knowledge of his court date to provide an overriding motivating reason
against failing to appear. Accordingly, my account correctly entails that
in the court's example, Jackson's latent knowledge of his court date
would be adequately connected to the actus reus of failing to appear,
such that a conviction for the crime of knowingly failing to appear would
be in order.
Thus, whether or not one's latent knowledge will be appropriately
connected to the actus reus in a given case will depend heavily on
whether one is in circumstances that make it reasonable to expect that
one's latent knowledge should trigger an overriding motivating reason
against performing the actus reus in question. (Note that the present
account also has plausible implications about corporate cases that are
analogous to latent knowledge,'1 5 as well as deviant causation cases.1 16)
114. Jackson v. State, 85 P.3d 1042, 1043 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
115. Recall the case in which a corporation is charged with making false
statements to the US government, discussed supra, note 78. Employee Alice
submitted the report without knowing it contained false statements. Employee
Betty, who did not work on the report with Alice, happened to pick up a copy of
the report and saw certain false statements in it, but did not recognize the
significance of the statements or the report itself. The present account entails
that the connection requirement is not satisfied here. After all, Betty worked on
different matters from Alice and had no way of knowing the significance of the
false statements or the intended uses of the report. Therefore, Betty was not in a
position in which we would have expected her knowledge to trigger any
motivating reasons-either on her part or on the part of any other corporate
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Before proceeding, let me address one potential source of
confusion. Specifically, one might wonder what happens if it is already
the case that-even without the relevant knowledge-you ought to have
an overriding motivating reason against doing the actus reus, i.e. one
with sufficient strength to override any motivation you might feel in
favor of doing it. For example, even if you do not have any reason to
think someone is in the building you intend to bum down, it still might
be the case that you ought to have a decisive motivating reason not to
bum it down. After all, it does not belong to you, and you should have a
desire not to damage the property interests of others (or something along
these lines).
This is not a problem for the account defended here, however.
After all, the knowledge that someone is inside the building should
provide you with an additional motivating reason not to bum down the
building. If the motivating reasons you should have had not to bum
employee-against submitting the report to the government. In Betty's
situation, she could not have been expected to be motivated by her knowledge to
tell Alice or any of her other coworkers about her discovery of the false
statements, or in any other way to give other employees in the corporation any
motivating reasons not to submit the report in its current condition.
Accordingly, the normative inquiry recommended by my account yields the
result that the connection requirement is not satisfied as between Betty's
knowledge and the submission of the report.
By contrast, my account yields the opposite result in the variation of the
corporate case where Betty* is Alice's direct subordinate and both were
involved in the preparation of the report. It can reasonably be expected that
practices will be in place within the corporation to enable pertinent information
to rise through the ranks, such that those who carry out key actions-like Alice
in submitting of the report the government-have the relevant facts before them.
Accordingly, Betty*'s knowledge of the falsehoods in the report should have
given rise to a motivating reason on the part of Alice to refrain from the criminal
act in this case-i.e. a reason not to submit the report in its current condition.
Thus, this would be another case of causation by lack of contrary reasons. One
part of the corporate person (Betty*) possessed the relevant knowledge, and
another part of the corporate person (Alice) failed to be responsive to that
knowledge despite being in circumstances where it is fair to expect that this
knowledge in question trigger an appropriate response. Accordingly, on the
current account, the connection requirement would indeed be satisfied.
116. The present account says the connection requirement is satisfied for the
case of deviant causation discussed supra, note 54. In that case, Fred's
knowledge that a person is in the building should indeed have given him
overriding motivation not to set the building on fire. Because he was not thus
motivated, despite being in circumstances where such motivation can reasonably
be expected, the connection requirement is satisfied as between his knowledge
and his actions.
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down the building in the first place were not sufficient to get you to
abstain from doing so, then clearly the knowledge that someone is inside
the building should tip the scales in favor of not burning it down. If you
proceed to burn down the building despite your knowledge that someone
is inside, this reveals an even greater degree of insufficient regard for
others than would be manifested in the absence of such knowledge.
Accordingly, the account defended here remains plausible despite this
complication.17
117. An additional question my account might raise concerns the much-
discussed, tragic cases in which someone purely by accident leaves a pet (or
worse a child) to languish in the car in extreme heat or cold, only to remember
too late. It is key to these cases that no obvious animus was involved; the pet or
child simply slipped the actor's mind. See, e.g., SHER, supra note 44, at 24;
Holly Smith, Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
115, 115-16 (2011). These cases are typically treated as cases of negligence.
Id. Nevertheless, my account might seem to entail that the actors in these cases
not only acted knowingly, but indeed that the connection requirement between
the relevant piece of knowledge and conduct was satisfied. Perhaps one finds
this implausible.
This objection admits of two replies. First, many of these cases are likely to
involve genuine forgetting, as opposed to the latent possession of actual
knowledge. That is, the actor in question (depending on the facts of the case) is
likely to not be aptly described as possessing genuine (albeit latent) knowledge
of the pet or child in the car; rather, the more apt description is likely to be that
the actor completely forgot about the pet or child, and no longer had access to
the pertinent information. If the actor genuinely forgot, then she would not be
plausibly characterized as latently knowing. But my account would only entail
that the connection requirement is satisfied if the actor really did possess
genuine knowledge of the child or the pet at the relevant time (even if just
latently). Accordingly, my account will not have the problematic implication
that the connection requirement is satisfied in very many real-life versions of
these cases.
To this, one might respond that there could be some cases in which one really
did latently possess the relevant knowledge of the pet or child in the car at the
time. Thus, a second answer to the present objection is that in such cases, the
correct result is that the connection requirement really is satisfied. That is, in
cases where it is undisputed that the actor really did possess latent knowledge,
but nonetheless found herself in circumstances where we can expect this
knowledge to provide an overriding motivating reason against leaving the pet or
child in the car but it didn 't, then the actor really did knowingly leave the pet or
child in the car. If there is no reasonable excuse or explanation for why the
actor's knowledge of the pet or child in the car failed to trigger a motivating
reason against leaving the pet or child where it was, then this knowledge
plausibly was connected in the required way to the actor's conduct.
Accordingly, conviction of a knowledge crime seems appropriate-even if the
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B. Extending the Account to Recklessness
An additional benefit of the account I have developed here is the
ease with which it can be extended to recklessness. After all, whereas
criminal knowledge amounts to practical certainty that the inculpatory
proposition is true, recklessness can be understood as the awareness that
there exists a substantial chance that it is (or will be) true. Accordingly,
we get the following:
Connection Requirement for Recklessness: D's belief, B, that there is
a substantial risk that the relevant inculpatory proposition p is true
(where p could be, e.g., that one's conduct will cause harm) is
appropriately connected to D's performance of the actus reus, A, if
and only if:
(1) D possesses B at least latently during the relevant part of his
performance of A,
(2) while A'ing (or the relevant part of it) D is in conditions
(cognitive, situational, etc.) where we would expect B to give a
law-abiding person in D's situation a decisive (overriding)
motivating reason not to do A (i.e. to do something besides A
that would not risk imposing the relevant harm associated with
p), and
(3) B did not actually give D a motivating reason against A of
sufficient strength to get him to refrain from doing A (i.e. he did
A anyway).
One might be puzzled over the fact that the above account does not
explicitly mention that the defendant must be aware not only that the
relevant risk is substantial, but also that it is unjustified.118 Nonetheless,
this requirement that one be aware of an unjustified risk can be
understood in terms of the relevant excusing conditions mentioned in
prong (2). After all, if D really does (reasonably) think he has justifying
reasons for imposing the risk in question, then D will not be in conditions
that would make us expect D's awareness of the risk to trigger an
overriding motivating reason against doing A. Accordingly, it follows
from my account that the connection requirement will be satisfied only if
the defendant believes that the risk in question is both substantial and
unjustified.
case also is likely involve mitigating circumstances that a judge should take into
consideration when sentencing the defendant.
118. Cf supra note 59 (noting that the MPC defines recklessness as acting
despite being aware of a substantial and unjustified risk).
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But notice that the same result does not necessarily arise in the case
of knowledge. In principle, it could have, of course. That is, in principle
the law might have been such that one is only guilty of a knowledge
crime provided one does the actus reus with knowledge of the
inculpatory proposition and one is not aware of any circumstances that
would justify the truth of that proposition. However, as Simons himself
observes in another paper,1 9 this is not what the law actually requires. In
reality, the law takes it that except for the few formally recognized
affirmative defenses, there are no conditions that justify knowing
criminal conduct.120  In this way, knowledge crimes differ from
recklessness crimes. My account helps explain this difference.
C. Concluding Remarks
The account of the connection requirement for knowledge and
recklessness defended in this Article has significant explanatory power.
In particular, it provides a normative test for whether a particular piece of
knowledge, or the awareness of a particular substantial and unjustifiable
risk, is appropriately connected to the actus reus to ground the
corresponding culpability attributions and criminal sanctions. This test is
not counterfactual in nature, and thus does not risk attributing culpability
to defendants on the basis of how they would behave in non-actual
circumstances (i.e. how they merely were willing to act). Rather, my test
looks at the actual circumstances of the defendant's conduct, and asks
whether the defendant's knowledge of some inculpatory fact, or
awareness of a given risk, can be expected to trigger an overriding
motivating reason not to perform the actus reus of the crime in question.
If this can be expected of the defendant, and if he proceeds to perform
the actus reus anyway, this reveals that the motivating reason we
expected him to have. was not triggered because he possessed an
insufficient amount of regard for the interests of others. This, then,
explains the culpability of the defendant's knowing or reckless
misconduct.
Furthermore, this approach can be applied not only to knowledge or
risk-awareness that is fully conscious, but also to cases of latent or not
fully conscious knowledge or risk-awareness. In those cases, too, we can
119. Ken Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 474-75
(1992) ("Once an actor perceives a 'highly probable' risk of physical harm, she
is prima facie liable for assault or murder. She must fit within a limited number
of defenses in order to avoid conviction. But an actor who perceives only a
"substantial" risk is not liable unless her conduct both is unjustifiable and is a
'gross deviation' from social norms, considering all of the circumstances.").
120. Id.
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profitably ask whether the defendant's latent knowledge, or latent
awareness of the risk, should have triggered an overriding motivating
reason (or at least an additional one) to abstain from the actus reus. If it
should have and he did the actus reus, then the connection requirement
will be satisfied. However, if he is not in conditions where we would
expect his latent knowledge or risk-awareness to trigger such a
motivating reason, then the requirement will not be satisfied.
Accordingly, this Article provides a principled way to separate the cases
of latent knowledge or risk-awareness in which the connection
requirement is satisfied from those cases in which it is not.

